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bcm  Billion cubic meters 
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By coincidence perhaps more than design, the ‘winds of change’ in the twelve months between 
autumn 2018 and 2019 ushered in new governments—whether through national elections or 
through coalition reshuffling—in five Baltic Sea littoral states: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland. Yet, amidst sometimes rather turbulent domestic political debates, one key cluster of topics 
was virtually absent: energy security and climate policy. With the vital exception of Finland—a state 
with a relatively strong Green movement and long tradition of climate and environmental activism—
no country saw climate or energy security targets raised as key campaign issues. To the extent that 
energy security topics were mentioned at all, they either were minimized due to parties’ fear of 
alienating key voting blocs (as with the coal mining sector in Poland), confined to energy 
stakeholders and technical audiences due their complexity (as with electricity desynchronisation in 
the Baltic countries) or completely assimilated into a cross-party foreign policy consensus (as in the 
universal opposition in Lithuania to the Astravyets nuclear power plant project in Belarus). 
While domestic factors—including perceived national interests in ensuring energy self-sufficiency—
contributed to a serious case of policy inertia, small and interconnected countries do not of course 
exist in a vacuum. Accordingly, international factors—from the continuing use of energy policy as an 
instrument of geopolitical power by Russia, to the growing consensus in the EU in favor of more 
ambitious climate targets—have done more to raise the salience of these issues, especially after the 
von der Leyen Commission took office in Brussels at the end of 2019 and put forward the so-called 
European Green Deal. These exogenous factors have finally, for instance, triggered a broader 
reassessment in Estonia of that country’s rather leisurely planned phase-out of oil shale power 
generation, while pushing political leaders in all five countries at least rhetorically to embrace the 
goal of a carbon-neutral future (albeit with considerable differences in timelines and methodology). 
Amidst a volatile international economic and geopolitical context that—since the time work began 
on this report—now includes a major global pandemic and a dramatic fall in fossil fuel demand and 
prices, the region’s political and economic leaders clearly cannot count on being able to make their 
policy selections in a vacuum. While the goal of an integrated regional energy market is closer than 
ever to being achieved, regional cooperation still has much to be desired; differing attitudes to issues 
both technical (e.g. harmonising natural gas regulations, which has left Lithuania outside a new 
regional market) or fundamental (importing third-country electricity generated without regard to EU 
climate or pollution standards) leave all five countries less able to respond to challenges ahead. 
While the region’s countries have largely relied on Brussels to broker compromises (often with the 
help of considerable funding), in a post-pandemic world, both the political bandwidth and financial 
resources will likely be constrained. In its country sections, this report captures a valuable snapshot 
of the relative inertia as well as the degree of evolution of the energy and climate policies of the five 
countries in the face of that year’s fairly calm international context. Given the significant economic, 
human, and political changes underway as a result of the pandemic, however, it is an open question 
to what extent the region can weather the far more turbulent times ahead. The political and societal 
willingness to pursue the energy transition to a carbon-neutral future through new—more ambitious 
and certainly more expensive—energy and climate policies as a response to the climate emergency 
will very much depend on how the impact of the pandemic plays out globally, in Europe and in the 
Baltic area. It will also require strong leadership from a new generation of political, business and 
societal leaders able to see green recovery as a major opportunity for their nations in terms of 
economic development, social welfare and national security. 
 
  
 
  
In a space of one year, from autumn 2018 until 
autumn 2019, five countries of the Baltic region 
have undergone a period of political change. 
Latvia’s new government emerged from a 
complex and protracted coalition-building in 
late 2018. In spring 2019, both Estonia and 
Finland held parliamentary elections that led to 
the formation of new governing coalitions. At 
the same time, Lithuania chose a new 
president—who in that country’s system plays 
an important role in national security and 
foreign policy-making; moreover, a cabinet 
reshuffle that summer brought several new 
parties and ministers into government. In 
national elections later that year, the governing 
party in Poland retained control of the lower 
chamber of parliament, but lost its majority in 
the upper chamber. All these electoral events 
produced shifts in the political landscape that 
will shape national and regional policies not 
only on individual issues, but on topics that cut 
across sectors—such as energy. 
The aim of this study is to analyse the impact of 
the political cycle of 2018-2019 on the energy 
security and climate policies in these five EU 
member states located along the Baltic Sea 
coast. In each case study, it investigates the 
following questions: 
 How salient have energy and climate 
policy—as well as energy security— 
topics been in the political agenda of 
each country prior, during and after its 
elections? Why? 
 What are the main issues on this 
agenda, and what are the views held 
towards those issues by the political 
actors now in government? Have these 
created major fault lines in national 
political discourse? 
 What are the anticipated or expected 
changes in the energy and climate 
policies of each country? What the 
main obstacles in pursuing those 
changes? To what degree has 
continuity been maintained with 
existing strategies and policies? 
 How is the country’s government 
(re)defining national interests and 
priorities in energy policy? What will be 
its main ‘signature’ policy initiatives or 
‘flagship’ projects in this area? 
 Is the national assessment of energy 
security and climate threats evolving as 
a result of the political changes? How? 
 How is the government framing energy 
security challenges related to Russia 
and Belarus? What role does it see for 
the US and the EU in tackling those 
challenges? 
 What is the new government’s 
perspective on the EU’s energy and 
climate policies and strategies? 
 How does the government view 
regional energy cooperation in general, 
and ongoing or planned strategic 
infrastructure projects? How does it 
define national interests vis-à-vis other 
regional players—and how does it 
perceive policies and positions of those 
players? 
 What are the political risks in each 
studied country to strategic energy 
projects, cooperation initiatives and 
overall energy security in the Baltic 
region? 
While this report was being drafted, a new 
European Commission led by Ursula von der 
Leyen took office in late 2019, as a result of the 
European Parliament elections held in May of 
that year. The new Commission immediately 
launched the European Green Deal, a very 
ambitious initiative that seeks to turn Europe 
into a carbon-neutral continent by 2050.1 It 
entails a profound transformation not only of 
Europe’s energy, transportation, industry, 
agriculture, housing and consumer sectors, but 
also of its overall technological base—all within 
                                                          
1
 See European Commission, “The European Green Deal: Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions,” COM(2019) 640 final, 11 December 2019.  
  
 
  
a relatively short period of time. The disruption 
to the entrenched economic models and 
investments might be of such a scale that some 
EU Member States are pausing to reflect on 
whether they would be able to commit 
themselves wholeheartedly to this initiative in 
its current form—while all need to consider 
what kind of measures they would need to 
pursue to mitigate the plan’s impact on those 
most exposed to the transformation. The key 
political actors in each country have had quickly 
to articulate responses to this initiative based 
not only on cost-benefit analyses but also on 
the unique political, societal and economic 
characteristics and interests of each country. 
The report accordingly, captures and reflects 
the impact of the European Green Deal on 
governmental policies and national debates in 
the five countries. 
For this report, we considered political rhetoric 
and electoral manifestos in each country—as 
well as public sentiment towards energy and 
climate issues; reviewed the programmes and 
strategies guiding the work of each newly-
formed government; monitored public 
statements and activities by officials and 
institutions; and, in some cases, 
conducted interviews with key 
energy and climate policymakers 
and experts. 
By presenting the findings, insights 
and analysis based on this 
research, the report sheds light on 
the energy and climate policies of 
the five studied nations while exploring the 
degree of change and continuity of these 
policies as shaped by the domestic political 
developments. It will help readers to better to 
assess the political risk as well as the possible 
opportunities to enhance energy security and 
cooperation across the region—especially as 
countries seek to fulfil the climate policy goals 
that each nation sets for itself within the 
context of EU benchmarks and ambitions. 
 
 
 
Neither climate policy nor energy security were 
among the most important issues in the 
election manifestos of Estonia’s main political 
parties in the run-up to parliamentary elections 
in spring 2019. None of the political actors 
seem to have identified the sector as a major 
opportunity for differentiating themselves from 
their competitors, or as representing an area 
for potential policy changes in direction.  
These topics, however, were important 
elements in the policy programmes of the 
previous governments, albeit driven by the 
broader objective of trying to achieve the goals 
set by the EU. In general, Estonian energy and 
climate policy has been governed by two 
strategic documents approved in 2017: the 
National Development Plan of the Energy 
Sector until 2030 and General Principles of 
Climate Policy until 2050. The goal of the latter 
is to decrease CO2 emissions in Estonia by 80% 
compared to 1990 levels, establishing interim 
goals of a 70% reduction by 2030 and 72% by 
2040. It thus envisages a number of important 
policy measures such as: 
 Encouraging  key actors in the energy 
and industry sectors to reduce  
greenhouse gas emissions in an 
efficient and cost-effective manner 
while continuing the use of market-
based mechanisms; 
 Ensuring energy security and security of 
supply by gradually expanding the use 
of domestic renewable energy sources 
                                                          
2 This chapter partly draws upon four interviews carried out during 
November 2019 with  representatives of the Estonian Parliament 
(Riigikogu), government, energy industry and non-governmental energy 
expert community; all spoke on the condition that their remarks not be 
attributed for publication in this report. 
Neither climate policy nor energy security were 
among the most important issues in the election 
manifestos of Estonia’s main political parties in the 
run-up to parliamentary elections in spring 2019 
  
 
  
(RES) in all sectors of final consumption, 
with a view to increasing the welfare of  
society as a whole; 
 Promoting the greater use of more 
efficient vehicles and sustainable 
alternative fuels through public-sector 
investments and tax policies; 
 Prioritising the development of energy-
efficient and non-motorised forms of 
public and freight transport; 
 Developing and maintaining significant 
land carbon stocks, especially in 
agricultural land; 
 Enhancing the production and 
exploitation—notably in energy-
intensive manufacturing processes—of 
bioenergy; 
 Increasing forest growth and carbon 
sequestration ability through 
productive and sustainable woodland 
management; 
 Avoiding further drainage of wetlands 
while restoring near-natural water 
regimes in drained peat bogs; 
 Continuing to reduce waste generation 
while making separated waste 
collection more efficient.3  
As for the National Development Plan, the 2030 
targets for Estonia’s energy sector will be met 
when certain specific expected outcomes are 
achieved, including the following: 
 Fuel and electricity markets operate in a 
free, unsubsidised and open manner;  
 Electricity generated from renewable 
sources accounts for 50% of domestic 
final electricity consumption, while new 
renewable electricity generation 
capacity is built under the conditions of 
an open electricity market without 
additional domestic subsidies;  
 The share of the largest supply source 
in Estonia’s gas market does not exceed 
70%;  
 The share of the largest gas seller in 
Estonia’s gas market does not exceed 
32%;  
                                                          
3 Riigikogu (Parliament of Estonia), General Principles of Climate Policy until 
2050 (Tallinn: Ministry of the Environment, April 2017). 
 80% of heat generated in Estonia is 
generated from renewable sources; the 
importance of local energy sources for 
heat generation has increased through 
the use of peat. (The target is to be met 
primarily through market mechanisms);  
 Renovation efforts have improved the 
energy efficiency of buildings (40% of 
small residential buildings are energy 
efficiency class C or D, 50% of 
apartment buildings and  20% of non-
residential buildings are class C);  
 New buildings have an energy 
performance indicator that conforms to 
the requirement for nearly zero-energy 
buildings;  
 Fuel consumption of vehicles in 2030 
does not exceed 2012 levels (8.3 TWh).4  
On energy security and regional cooperation, 
Estonian efforts in recent years have focused on 
two initiatives: the planned synchronisation of 
the Baltic electricity grid with that of 
Continental Europe, and the creation of a 
Finnish-Estonian-Latvian joint gas market (made 
possible after the December 2019 completion 
of the Balticconnector undersea gas pipeline 
from Estonia to Finland.)  
After the elections, energy and climate policy 
topics have gained momentum first due to a 
high CO2 price that, in conjunction with the 
imports of electricity from Russia, resulted in 
layoffs in the Estonian energy sector.5 Second, 
the Estonian government publicly hesitated to 
adopt the EU’s ambitious goal of achieving 
carbon neutrality by 2050.6 This hesitation was 
due to its desire first to carry out an analysis to 
understand the scale and feasibility of the 
commitment. After a study was conducted by 
the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI)—
which found that Estonia would need to  invest  
                                                          
4 Government of Estonia, National Development Plan of the Energy Sector 
until 2030 (Tallinn: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, 
October 2017). 
5
 Electricity generation in Russia is not subject to EU environmental rules or 
CO2 quota obligations, thereby creating a market distortion that has led to 
unfair competition between EU and Russian electricity generators. Russian 
electricity—imported via Lithuania and Finland—amounted to 10% of 
regional consumption in the three Baltic states plus Finland (13 TWh) in 
2018. See “Russia and Belarus electricity suppliers exploit EU law, grow in 
Baltics,” ERR/ERR News, 10 January 2019. 
6 Epp Ehand, “Euroopa valitsusjuhid jätsid 2050. aasta kliimaneutraalsuse 
joone alla” [European heads of government keep 2050 as the deadline for 
climate neutrality], ERR, 20 June 2019. 
  
 
  
€17.3 billion to achieve carbon neutrality by the 
target date—in October 2019 the government 
duly approved the objective.7 
Public communication explaining the reasoning 
for the government’s hesitation has been 
relatively poor, while the inclusion of the 
Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) in 
the governing coalition created the impression 
that climate change deniers have come to 
power and may stymie Estonia’s efforts to align 
its policies with those of the rest of the EU. 
However, EKRE does not appear to have a 
particularly strong ideological position on 
climate change; it employs climate-change 
denying rhetoric opportunistically in order to 
distinguish itself from its political competition, 
while also mimicking similar rhetoric from 
similar parties in other countries.  
Accordingly, the coalition partners in 
the Estonian government do not seem 
to have conflicting positions on either 
climate or energy policy topics. They 
seem to have chosen a pragmatic 
approach to following EU policies and 
meeting the country’s EU obligations; 
the unity of the new three-party 
governing coalition (composed of the 
Centre party, Isamaa party and EKRE) in 
pursuing the ambitious 2050 target has been 
surprisingly strong. Meanwhile, the opposition 
has been more than supportive; in fact, there 
seems to be a race between the coalition and 
opposition as to who appears to support carbon 
neutrality more. If one looks at individual 
parties more closely, EKRE and Isamaa have 
                                                          
7 Siim Meeliste et al, Eesti Kliimaambitsiooni tõstmise võimaluste analüüs 
[Analysis of the possibilities to raise Estonia’s climate ambitions] (Tallinn: 
Stockholm Environment Institute, September 2019); Ege Tamm, “Valitsus 
otsustas toetada kliimaneutraalsuse saavutamist” [The Government 
decided to support achieving climate neutrality], Postimees, 3 October 
2019. 
been relatively more sceptical but are still doing 
as much as required, while Centre (the largest 
of the three coalition parties) and the main 
opposition Reform party seem both to be more 
forward-leaning and more willing to tackle yet 
more ambitious goals. From a practical point of 
view, the main question about the goal of 
carbon neutrality is whether Estonia 
can afford it—while, at the same 
time, retaining security of supply. In 
the current government, there 
appears to be a consensus—partly 
based on the findings of the above-
mentioned SEI study—that 
achieving carbon neutrality is 
feasible and doable. 
Despite this apparent public consensus, 
however, some interviewed experts privately 
claim that the current Estonian government 
lacks serious ideas on energy and climate 
issues, and has failed to anticipate and prevent 
challenges; it simply reacts to problems as they 
arise. It is probable that the CO2 price will 
increase even further, as some interlocutors 
interviewed for this report argued; the 
government needs to take that into account, 
making adjustments to Estonian energy policy 
already now. According to those interlocutors, 
fossil fuels are not popular, and the world is on 
the verge of a major energy transformation and 
shift towards carbon neutrality; Estonia should 
thus strengthen its position so that it leads from 
the front instead of lagging behind. 
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Energy and climate policy in Estonia is 
continuous policy, which means that no 
ground-breaking shifts or changes should be 
expected during this parliamentary term. The 
objective of reducing carbon emissions in the 
energy sector (as well as in the economy in 
general) has been long established in national 
plans. With the growing attention to climate 
concerns, the focus on decarbonisation and 
carbon neutrality has also increased—and may 
even drive  change in other sectors as well. 
However, as long as the details of the new EU 
carbon neutrality policy remain 
unclear, no major changes to the 
already approved long-term national 
plans should be expected. That said, it 
remains to be seen what the impact 
on these plans will be of the European 
Green Deal, or of the generally more 
assertive and ambitious EU climate 
policy under the leadership of Ursula 
von der Leyen’s Commission. 
In this respect, it is important to note that while 
the Estonian energy sector is strongly affected 
by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS)—it 
covers about 70% of national carbon 
emissions—Estonia’s power to influence the 
system is rather small. As a result, the CO2 price 
represents about half of the price paid by the 
final consumer for electricity generated in 
Estonia. As the coronavirus pandemic engulfing 
much of the world beginning in spring 2020—
and the developing global economic crisis—
have put the Estonian government under 
pressure, current Minister of Finance Martin 
Helme (EKRE) has even suggested that Estonia 
should explore ways of temporarily 
withdrawing from the ETS in order to reduce 
the price of electricity and facilitate economic 
recovery.8 At the time of writing, it remains to 
be seen how this proposal will be viewed by 
coalition partners and the European 
Commission. However, when it comes to the 
non-ETS sectors, the government seems to seek 
an increasingly active role, e.g. by pursuing 
railway electrification or increased industrial 
                                                          
8 “Helme wants Estonia temporarily out of EU emissions trading system,” 
ERR News, 6 April 2020.  
energy efficiency. The required investments will 
constitute an important part of the economic 
recovery package for the post-pandemic period. 
While the role of the EU agenda in shaping 
Estonia’s national plans and priorities is 
significant, the country’s assessment of energy 
security and climate threats is also evolving due 
to the loss of market viability of the old 
generation of oil shale power plants. With 
insufficient new generation capacity being 
introduced to replace completely those plants 
coming offline, overall electricity production 
capacity is decreasing—and therefore having a 
major impact on security of supply. With less 
redundancy (and thus resilience) in the energy 
sector, the government is confronted with hard 
questions about contending with the loss of 
income from exporting surplus electricity 
produced in those plants, maintaining 
competitive market and increasing domestic 
production by sending appropriate signals to 
investors about the long term prospects of 
investing in new production capacities.  
Some interviewees suggested the energy sector 
should be careful about making new 
investments in fossil fuels; since it could  
increase the amount of stranded assets, they 
argued, the focus should instead be maintained 
on renewable energy as well as customer based 
solutions and innovation. From a 
decarbonisation point of view, the problem is 
that some large investments have already been 
made in the Estonian energy sector to continue 
using oil shale rock for producing electricity or 
shale oil.9 Moreover, due to continuing 
demand, some additional new investments into 
shale oil production plants are pending; from an 
economic perspective, it would thus not be 
reasonable to leave the resource in the ground 
                                                          
9 David Crouch, “Estonia sees a bright future for oil shale,“ The Financial 
Times, 5 June 2015. 
From a decarbonisation point of view, the 
problem is that some large investments have 
already been made in the Estonian energy sector 
to continue using oil shale rock for producing 
electricity or shale oil 
  
 
  
even if it does not conform to energy transition 
goals and climate policies. In this perspective, 
the European Green Deal is seen as a major 
threat to the industry—and even a violation of 
investor expectations (based as they were on 
pre-Green Deal national energy plans) that 
requires compensation. However, the European 
Green Deal envisages providing only €125 
million in compensation to affected Estonian 
businesses through the planned EU Just 
Transition Fund (JTF)—a figure that is seen by 
some industry representatives as woefully 
inadequate.10 The opposing argument—
advanced by the Reform Party, among others—
is that perhaps Estonia should completely turn 
its back on fossil fuels for electricity production, 
write off the bad investments (in terms of 
environmental sustainability and energy 
transition)  already made, and leave oil shale in 
the ground for the time being.11 Oil shale is 
composed of many different elements, some of 
which are very valuable outside the energy 
sector—for example, the chemical industry. 
While the  science and technology is not yet at 
the point to exploit this value fully, the 
argument goes, it is simply a matter 
of time until new ideas appear 
about how to better utilise this 
resource outside the energy 
sector—and thus, in complete 
alignment with the country’s 
energy transition goals. 
For now the Estonian government has declared 
that, in the short and medium term, energy 
security and economic development 
considerations prevail over carbon neutrality, 
arguing that the state has clear interests in 
                                                          
10 “VKG: If EU Green Deal damages oil industry, state must pay 
compensation,” ERR News, 11 February 2020.  
11 “Kaja Kallas: põlevkivisse jätkuv investeerimine pole mõistlik“ [Kaja 
Kallas: Continued investments in oil shale are not prudent], ERR, 14 
November 2019. 
preserving the oil shale sector. For example, in 
August 2019, the state-owned energy company, 
Eesti Energia, announced that 1,000 MW of 
generating capacity in Narva will be kept in 
reserve until 2023.12 (Due to the high CO2 price, 
continuous operation of those 
power plant units in Narva was 
not feasible in a competitive 
electricity market). Moreover, the 
government made a decision to 
support building of a new shale oil 
pre-refining plant, thus provoking 
a protest from the environmental 
organisations and drawing 
accusations of violating Estonia’s 
international commitments.13 From those 
decisions it can be inferred that for this 
government, the goal of carbon neutrality is 
more distant than concerns about energy 
security, security of supply and the economy as 
a whole. The government does not oppose the 
objective of carbon neutrality; however, it 
wants to ensure that this goal does not become 
a source of heightened economic and security 
risks. It also must be noted that political 
considerations might have played an important 
role in crafting this approach: the heavily 
Russian-speaking population in the oil shale 
mining region of north-eastern Estonia 
represents an important segment of the 
Centre’s base of support.  
However, even while it sends signals about 
continuing to rely (at least partially) on oil 
shale, the government is also preparing the 
future ground for what is often referred to as 
‘Põxit’ (from põlevkivi, the Estonian for ‘oil 
shale’)—that is, abandoning the use of this 
fossil fuel source in power generation, while 
mitigating its socio-economic impact. For 
instance, it approved plans to switch newer 
                                                          
12 “Eesti Energia koondab 324 töötajat“ [Eesti Energia is laying off 324 
employees], ERR, 3 September 2019. 
13 “Government greenlights new €286 million oil shale plant,” ERR News, 27 
March 2020; “Organizations: Estonian government shale oil goals 
contradict EU agreements,” ERR News/BNS, 12 May 2020. 
Even while it sends signals about continuing to rely 
(at least partially) on oil shale, the government is 
also preparing the future ground for what is often 
referred to as ‘Põxit’ 
For now the Estonian government has declared that, 
in the short and medium term, energy security and 
economic development considerations prevail over 
carbon neutrality, arguing that the state has clear 
interests in preserving the oil shale sector 
  
 
  
power generation units in Narva to biomass.14 
Estonia’s power grid companies have also 
directed significant efforts to accommodating a 
much greater share of renewables in the 
system.  
Indeed, the European Green Deal and 
decarbonisation of the economy are being 
increasingly touted by some senior Estonian 
officials, legislators and entrepreneurs as a 
major opportunity for an economic 
transformation on par with the ‘tiger’s leap’ 
digital revolution that has propelled Estonia’s 
development in recent years. For instance, one 
leading technology entrepreneur framed it as 
“the biggest business opportunity for Estonia 
since the Internet revolution.”15 If this narrative 
gains traction in the country, it will have a 
powerful effect on mitigating the perception 
that the energy transition is only about losses—
whether of a major industry or of energy self-
sufficiency, jobs or social welfare. In this 
context, there has been a strong focus on 
renewable energy production and storage 
technology as well as electrification in the 
transport sector. There has also been some 
interest in small-scale nuclear power generation 
technology development, including even in 
building a small modular reactor (SMR) in 
Estonia.16 Although the ambition was endorsed 
by the Prime Minister Jüri Ratas as one of the 
elements of the country’s energy transition, 
these potential plans already face opposition 
from the Green movement.17 
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Another recent example of policy continuity—
albeit with some political friction—is the 
decision to allocate money to make wind power 
generation possible in north-eastern Estonia 
without negative impact on the country’s 
military security—as Estonia’s current air 
surveillance radar system is subject to 
interference from wind turbines.18 In early 
November 2019, the government agreed to 
purchase a new radar system expected 
to cost €72 million (including 
operational costs) over the next 20 
years. This decision will allow new wind 
turbine generator parks to be 
developed, thereby resolving a long-
standing dispute between private 
investors pursuing investment 
opportunities in renewable energy 
production on the one hand, and on the 
other a state responsible not just for 
managing the country’s energy transition, but 
also charged with responding to military threats 
(especially from Russia). As the investors 
involved in the dispute sought resolution 
through some EKRE ministers, the matter even 
threatened to spill over into an open political 
conflict between EKRE and its coalition partner 
Isamaa, which holds the position of defence 
minister.19 The episode has served to 
underscore that a genuinely whole-of-
government and multi-stakeholder approach is 
required when balancing climate, economic and 
national security interests; it also highlights that 
that the country’s energy transition may have 
unanticipated side effects and costs that must 
be accounted for in both energy and defence 
planning. 
The Estonian position towards Russia and 
Belarus has not changed under the new 
government.  Neither country is considered a 
trustworthy partner in terms of energy security; 
accordingly, the new government—like its 
predecessors—sees a strong need for 
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synchronisation with the Continental European 
grid and for the development of a gas network 
with diversified supply sources and routes. 
However, the government does not find it 
necessary to call extra attention to the matter 
in international media or domestic political 
debates.  
To a large extent, projects aimed at reducing 
the dependence of Estonia and its fellow Baltic 
states on the energy supplies systems of Russia 
are funded by the EU—and thereby rooted in a 
shared vision for the future  of the energy 
market. Furthermore, the United States 
emerged as an important partner in 
regional energy security efforts, 
notably through recently expanded 
cooperation aimed at increasing cyber 
resilience and bolstering the Baltic 
states’ ability to protect critical energy 
infrastructure from cyber-attacks.20 
Overall, the Estonian government 
remains very open to regional 
cooperation, understands that certain 
common interests are achievable only through 
such cooperation, and wishes to promote and 
expand cooperation in areas of potential 
greater mutual benefit. 
A major test to this cooperative posture is the 
planned desynchronisation from the IPS/UPS 
(i.e., Russian) power grid and synchronisation 
with that of Continental Europe. It is a key 
flagship project for the Estonian government 
and the national transmission system operator 
(TSO), Elering, with the most difficult parts of 
the project yet to be carried out (see chapter 3 
for more details). It requires very close 
coordination and cooperation between the 
governments and TSOs of Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland as well as with the European 
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electricity networks], ERR, 7 October 2019. 
Commission.21 Arguably, according to some 
interviewees, the current level of ministerial 
cooperation and collaboration among ministers 
of the Baltic states is insufficient. On the other 
hand, as the project enters the 
implementation stage, it is trust 
and technical coordination 
between the TSOs rather than 
political rhetoric and symbolism of 
cooperation that matter more.  
However, it remains a project of 
high political significance. 
Although it plays no direct role in achieving 
carbon neutrality, desynchronisation is of major 
importance with regards to energy security and 
geopolitics.22 The success of this flagship project 
can be easily assessed; either the transition 
goes smoothly with no interruptions to power 
supply and no impact on system stability, or 
experiences failures that may cause blackouts 
and significant economic damage. While the 
2025 anticipated completion date of the project 
is two years after the current Estonian 
parliament’s mandate expires in 2023, any lack 
of progress—to say nothing of a collapse in 
regional cooperation—could backfire on the 
government, leaving it politically vulnerable 
during the next campaign (assuming it survives 
a full term in its present configuration).  
One potential risk of a political breakdown is 
related to the issue of the Astravyets nuclear 
power plant (NPP) in Belarus, the first reactor of 
which is set to become operational this year. 
Lithuania insists on banning electricity imports 
from non-EU NPPs that it deems unsafe (see 
chapter on Lithuania); however, some other 
regional stakeholders (notably Latvia) do not 
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seem to support this position. Part of the 
problem is that it is not possible to trace the 
source of electricity from a specific power plant. 
Even if Lithuania closes cross-border trade flows 
from Belarus, Latvia will likely continue to 
import electricity from its eastern neighbour. 
Although there is no direct electricity trade 
between Estonia and Belarus (nor will there be 
in future), Estonia’s position is that only the EU, 
not any particular EU member state, can 
impose restrictions on electricity trade with 
third countries; if such restrictions are imposed 
by Brussels, then Estonia will follow the rules.23 
It is not difficult to see how the positions of Riga 
and Tallinn regarding the Astravyets NPP could 
be perceived as a lack of solidarity in Vilnius, 
thereby leading to friction and even a 
breakdown of trust and cooperation on such 
strategic projects as desynchronisation. 
Another topic, in the context of the 
desynchronisation, is the political risk from the 
Russian side on how potential electricity 
imports from Kaliningrad will be solved once 
the Baltic states exit the BRELL (Belarus-Russia-
Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania) agreement 
and desynchronise from the IPS/UPS 
grid. While Lithuania and Kaliningrad 
are currently well-integrated parts of 
the same grid, connections will be 
limited—though to an unknown 
extent—after desynchronisation.24   
A number of new power plants have been built 
in Kaliningrad to ensure its ability to function 
independently.25 Since the Kaliningrad region is 
a Russian exclave, EU rules and regulations—
including on carbon emissions—do not apply, 
thus creating a situation of unfair competition 
with EU-based power plants if current trade 
flows remain in place. Currently, it seems that 
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 “Eesti ei välista Valgevene tuumaelektri kasutamist“ [Estonia does not 
rule out using electricity from Belarus nuclear power plant], ERR, 26 May 
2019. 
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 “Kaliningrad successfully tests independent local electricity grid,“ ERR 
News, 26 May 2019. 
25 Jo Harper, “EU-Russia power struggle flashes in Kaliningrad,” Central 
European Financial Observer, 2 April 2019. 
the Baltic states do not support the creation of 
an ‘energy island’ within the EU; however, this 
consensus is bound to be continuously tested 
by Russia’s actions.  
An additional and related concern is 
that countries will put their own 
interests first in case of 
emergencies—despite the existence 
of a single regional electricity market. 
This means that the existence of good 
interconnections alone might not be 
sufficient to maintain security of 
supply during a large-scale crisis. To address 
this concern, different scenarios should be 
tested; moreover, continuous Nordic-Baltic 
political consultations should be held to 
facilitate trust-building and maintaining 
solidarity. 
Yet another example of regional cooperation 
that highlights the difficulties of achieving and 
maintaining common strategic interests is the 
creation of a Finnish-Estonian-Latvian common 
gas market, which started operation at the 
beginning of this year—and which currently 
excludes Lithuania. Due to its different 
understanding of the nature of a common 
market, Lithuania was not ready to use the 
same principles for sharing income from gas 
transmission tariffs as the other three 
countries.26 This necessitates further dialogue 
supported and stimulated by strong political 
will from all sides. Ultimately, a larger market 
will help consumers obtain better prices, while 
strengthening energy security for all four states 
due to the added import routes and stronger 
competition.27 Yet, Lithuania may remain 
outside this new market at least for some 
time—thereby regional cooperation in energy 
security will be far from reaching its full 
potential. 
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The preconditions for Finland’s climate and 
energy policy shifted significantly with the 
change of government in 2019. Prime Minister 
Juha Sipilä’s government focused most of its 
efforts on jump-starting the Finnish economy. 
The government programme was built around 
the goal of ending the ‘spiral of decline’ that 
was perceived to have been caused in particular 
by lagging economic growth, rising 
unemployment and deteriorating 
competitiveness. Other issues, by and large, 
were seen either as secondary or as potential 
ways to aid economic growth. Climate change 
featured rather prominently in the latter role, 
as the programme put a strong emphasis on 
strengthening the Finnish bioeconomy.  
Meanwhile, the new government of then-Prime 
Minister Antti Rinne established climate change 
as a central focus of its attention.28 The 
government programme—which pointedly 
begins with the words 
“climate change”—is built 
around the goals of a 
socially, economically and 
ecologically sustainable 
society. It emphasises that 
the economic competitiveness of Finland can be 
secured by combining the Nordic welfare state 
model with sustainable or even diminishing 
consumption of natural resources. This 
approach inevitably has had significant 
repercussions in energy policy. 
The government has been in office for just a 
year, so the actual implementation of its policy 
goals is only beginning. It is therefore 
impossible to assess its achievements fairly at 
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 In December 2019—after this section was drafted—Antti Rinne resigned 
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party; the coalition composition and government programme remained the 
same.  
this point. However, the shift in policy is 
notable in itself, as it represents a considerable 
increase in the ambition of Finnish climate 
policy. 
The government of former Prime Minister Juha 
Sipilä, which was in office from 2015 to 2019, 
saw the leading Centre faction join forces with 
the National Coalition and Finns parties. This 
grouping did not propose a fast 
track on climate policy. 
Traditionally, climate change has 
not been a priority issue for the 
parties in Sipilä’s government, 
with the Finns Party in particular 
having expressed scepticism 
about the need to prevent 
climate change in some of its 
statements.29 Meanwhile, discussion about the 
elections in 2015 had been dominated by the 
difficult economic situation, which added 
legitimacy to the government’s focus on 
boosting economic growth.30 
However, in its programme, the government 
recognised environmental problems and 
climate change as national challenges.31 Its idea 
was to turn the risk into an opportunity to 
increase economic growth, as envisioned in the 
section entitled ‘Bioeconomy and Clean 
Solutions’—which emphasises renewable and 
domestic sources of energy, particularly liquid 
biofuels and biogas. In addition, the 
government aimed to boost Finnish cleantech 
companies and the circular economy. Its main 
targets were to increase the share of renewable 
energy to 50% of final consumption, raise the 
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percentage of domestic renewable energy to at 
least 55% and boost the portion of transport 
fuels from renewable sources to 40%, all by 
2030. In 2016, the government published its 
National Energy and Climate Strategy 2030, 
outlining an implementation plan for these 
targets. Finland also signed the Paris Agreement 
in 2016 and has remained committed to the 
EU’s 2030 climate and energy framework. 
Ultimately, the track record of Sipilä’s 
government on fighting climate change has 
been rather mixed. It has been argued that the 
focus on bioeconomy has led to policies that 
prioritised wood-based fuels and energy 
sources, thereby increasing forest harvesting 
and depleting the carbon sink.32 According to an 
impact assessment that the government itself 
commissioned on the Energy 
and Climate Strategy, its 
planned actions would not 
reduce Finland’s net 
emissions—as the decrease 
from other sectors would be 
offset by the increased 
utilisation of forests.33 
The public discussion on climate change in 
Finland intensified considerably between the 
parliamentary elections of 2015 and 2019. In 
the media, the autumn 2018 report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) received unprecedented attention. 
According to survey data, public concern over 
climate change had increased considerably; the  
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share of respondents expecting the government 
to implement a stringent climate policy had 
risen from 52% in 2015 to 70% in 2019.34 
Therefore, climate change became a major 
topic in the 2019 elections.35 In the media and 
in debates, the candidates 
were repeatedly asked about 
their views on issues like 
carbon sinks, emissions 
trading, and aviation tax.36 All 
parties were therefore 
obliged to formulate credible 
future plans on climate and energy policy. 
However, according to an assessment carried 
out by civil society organisations, the Greens 
and the Left Alliance were the only two (of 
eight) parties that were committed to the 
policies necessary to achieve emissions 
reductions compliant with the Paris 
Agreement.37 
The elections of 2019 were a game changer for 
Finnish climate and energy policy. After the 
heated discussion during the campaigns it is 
unlikely that any government could have 
brushed climate action off its programme. This 
was reflected in the agenda for government 
negotiations, led by the social democratic SDP. 
Ultimately, climate change and the energy 
transition had an impact on the selection of the 
government parties. The successful coalition 
that emerged—made up of the SDP, the 
Greens, Centre party and the Left Alliance, was  
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in many ways a coalition aimed at a progressive 
climate policy; nevertheless, it also required 
compromises. 
Out of the four governing parties, all but Centre 
have ambitious programmes on climate and 
energy. This is reflected in the new government 
programme, which is built on the principles of 
economic, social and ecological sustainability.38 
The government has an overarching goal of 
Finland becoming the first country in the world 
to reach carbon neutrality, by 2035, but it also 
stresses the need to accomplish this in a fair 
and equitable way. In other words, the 
transition should be carried out in a way that 
will not deepen societal divides or increase 
inequality. The government provides an outline 
for achieving these goals in the 
first of its seven strategic themes. 
The plan includes a range of 
measures like abolishing the 
current industrial energy tax 
rebate, offering tax incentives for 
wind power and energy storage as 
well as supporting investments 
and innovations in new energy 
technologies. 
The Rinne government also stresses the need to 
reform climate and energy policies on the 
European level. Although the programme does 
not mention the Energy Union or specific 
policies by name, it does strongly articulate a 
commitment to ensuring a carbon neutral EU 
by 2050. Finland also included climate change 
as one of the main themes of its EU presidency 
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ecologically sustainable society. Programme of Prime Minister Antti Rinne’s 
Government 2019,” Government of Finland, accessed 15 October 2019. 
during the second half of 2019. In addition, the 
government aims to reinforce Nordic 
cooperation on climate action, in particular 
through the integration and development of 
the Nordic electricity market and energy system 
as well as through joint research. In general, the 
programme suggests that Finland can globally 
be perceived as an actor punching above its 
weight on climate and energy policies. 
In August 2019, the government published its 
draft budget for 2020—and immediately 
attracted criticism for not backing its ambitious 
plans with adequate financing. While the 
proposed objectives require 
large, systematic policies, the 
draft budget only enables 
isolated and relatively small-
scale actions. Moreover, the 
Finnish Panel on Climate Change 
has pointed out that in order to 
achieve its goal of climate 
neutrality by 2035, Finland 
should cut its annual emissions by 35 million 
tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e). However, 
only 25.8 MtCO2e of emissions are currently 
covered by reduction plans that are in the 
implementation stages. This leaves an 
emissions gap of 11.95 MtCO2e without any 
plan or implementation, and a further 7.2 
MtCO2e that are covered by plans not currently 
being implemented.39 In other words, there is 
an urgent need for both further plans and 
implementation if the Finnish government 
wishes to achieve the targets it has set for itself. 
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This is even more true due to the long-term 
investments required to carry out an energy 
transition. In the absence of concrete steps, 
carbon neutrality targets are in effect rendered 
meaningless, as any future government would 
be able to change them—and indeed  might be 
obliged to do so in order to ensure security of 
supply.  
Despite its ambitious goals and flexible tactics, 
Finnish energy and climate policy are faced with 
several challenges. One emanates from within 
the government, as there are a few significant 
points of contradiction among the parties 
currently in power. In particular, the Centre 
party differs from its government partners in 
continuing to support both forestry and wood 
harvesting as well as the utilisation of peat for 
energy; by contrast, the Greens and the Left 
Alliance have publicly questioned the 
sustainability of these activities.40 The public 
controversy creates uncertainty about energy 
and climate policy goals, and raises doubt about 
the ability of the government to put these goals 
into action. 
These internal rifts within the government are 
particularly relevant, since these two issues are 
among the strongest challenges for Finnish 
energy and climate policy. In particular, forests 
have a significant role in efforts to reach carbon 
neutrality, both as carbon sinks and as sources 
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of renewable energy. These two functions tend 
to be in contradiction, however, as the 
increased utilisation of wood for energy will 
inevitably erode the carbon sink. Moreover, the 
EU agreement in 2017 to include the sector 
(known as land-use, land-use change and 
forestry [LULUCF]) in its climate targets means 
that increases in logging will have to be 
compensated by emissions reductions in other 
sectors. In 2017, Finland was successful in 
lobbying for flexibility in the way it accounts for 
forestry emissions; according to information 
obtained by civil society organisations, the 
government has maintained that position in 
ongoing negotiations.41 This already reflects 
negatively on the image of climate leadership 
that Finland has aimed to promote for itself, 
particularly during its Council presidency in the 
second half of 2019. Moreover, as the EU’s own 
climate ambitions increase—something that, as 
mentioned above, is itself a goal for the current 
Finnish government—there is a real possibility 
that the EU will set far more stringent LULUCF 
accounting regulations. This could considerably 
limit the implementation of wood-based 
bioeconomy plans.42  
Finland’s expectations that forestry 
and bioeconomy will play a role in 
its energy transition also have 
implications for energy security. In 
part, the role of these fuel sources 
was cemented by legislation passed 
by the outgoing Sipilä government 
in March 2019 banning the use of 
coal for electricity generation.43 
Although the move was welcomed 
by civil society organisations as a 
way to facilitate Finland’s energy transition, it 
also complicates the search for alternative 
energy sources, as plans to replace coal in 
district heating have relied heavily on wood-
based energy, especially in Helsinki. Concerns 
about the adequacy of biomass from domestic 
sources have led to suggestions that Finland 
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import wood from the Baltic region.44 This 
source might not be available, however, as 
demand within the Baltic states themselves 
might crowd out competition.45 The lower-
emission option of using side flows of forestry 
biomass would especially not be likely to cover 
Finnish demand, presenting a clear risk to 
energy security. Moreover, Finland will likely 
have to burn wood directly, thereby cancelling 
out any emissions reductions benefit, as this 
method produces the same—or greater—CO2 
emissions as coal.46  
Finnish energy security is also linked to its 
neighbours in various ways. Russia has 
traditionally been an important source of oil 
and (especially) gas imports; in this sense a 
transition to sustainable energy gives Finland a 
chance to increase its independence and reduce 
Russian influence.47 However, the impacts that 
could follow from a shift in Russia’s geopolitical 
position due to a decline in global fossil fuel 
demand have not yet been analysed in great 
detail in Finland.48 Meanwhile, public debate 
has also highlighted increasing Russian interest 
in Finnish nuclear power, which is a major non-
fossil electricity source for the country.49 The 
Finnish Security Intelligence Service (SUPO) has 
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reported attempts to influence Finnish 
decision-making on energy policy, though it has 
not explicitly linked them either to Russia or to 
nuclear energy.50 However, overall attitudes to 
nuclear power as a low-carbon energy source 
are relatively neutral; in the debates prior to 
the 2019 election, for example, the issue was 
largely absent. In the Rinne cabinet programme 
it features only once, in a commitment to 
renew permits for existing nuclear power plants 
as long as they are supported by the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority.51 
Meanwhile, the common Nordic electricity 
market Nord Pool has a significant role to play 
in Finnish energy security, especially from the 
point of view of supply. This flexibility may 
become increasingly important as the role of 
solar and wind power and 
other intermittent sources of 
power generation rises. 
However, the Nordic 
countries could cooperate 
further to facilitate their 
mutual energy transition; 
moreover, “in the future the 
Baltic states might also be more closely 
integrated with the Nordics,” but the terms of 
and opportunities for such integration remain 
ambiguous.52  
Finnish energy cooperation with the Baltic 
countries has been relatively low. In recent 
years, one major development has been the 
Balticconnector gas pipeline, which has been 
constructed between Estonia and Finland, 
providing an alternative to gas sourced directly 
from Russia. Effectively, this means that the 
Finnish gas market is now opened, providing 
immediate opportunities for new operators 
and, in  the  long  run,  perhaps  increasing  the  
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utilisation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 
biogas.53 However, as gas only constitutes 
about 6-8% of total energy consumption in 
Finland, this will not dramatically impact Finnish 
energy security, nor lead to total 
independence.54 In Finnish discussion, the 
recent development has thus far 
not led to any concrete plans for 
further gas sector integration 
with the Baltic countries.55 
However, energy security is a 
top priority for the EU, and the 
Energy Union may offer 
incentives for joint investments 
between Finland and the Baltic 
countries in the future. In the 
past, this has also created competition, as 
Finland and Estonia both sought the same EU 
financing to construct a regional LNG terminal. 
However, compromise was possible; indeed, 
their eventual decision to divide the project 
into two terminals—one in each country—is 
what gave rise to the Balticconnector pipeline 
linking the two.56 The compromise suggests that 
Finland and the Baltic countries may also be 
able to find cooperative and mutually beneficial 
solutions in the future as well. 
Overall, Finnish energy security is relatively 
comprehensively covered by the country’s 
wider security of supply policy, which aims to 
safeguard critical production, services and 
infrastructure for a functioning society.57 
However, the policy has so far not adequately 
reflected the magnitude of the changes 
necessary to implement energy transition and 
mitigate climate change. The necessary 
structural changes in Finnish production and 
consumption as well as potential geopolitical 
shifts in the surrounding world need to be 
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identified and taken into account in the security 
of supply outlook.58 
There still is a need for rapid and significant 
change in both climate and energy policy if 
Finland is to make the move towards globally 
sustainable development patterns. While the 
country is in many ways well equipped to carry 
out its energy transition, and while the current 
government has adopted ambitious climate 
targets, many questions still remain concerning 
the implementation of its initiatives. In the 
coming years, both determination and careful 
consideration will be necessary if Finland is to 
craft sustainable, fair and effective energy and 
climate policies. 
In Lithuania, the directly elected president not 
only has important constitutional powers such 
as directing together with the government, 
national security and foreign policy—but also 
occasionally holds broader informal political 
influence. The latter was strengthened during 
Dalia Grybauskaitė's two terms in office (2009-
2019). After an election, the president approves 
the new composition of a government and can 
influence the selection of particular ministers. 
For example, President Grybauskaitė took an 
active part in the nomination of energy 
ministers on two occasions—first after her re-
election in 2014, and later after the 2016 
parliamentary campaign. Thus, the minister of 
energy (like the ministers of defence and 
foreign affairs) has informally become a kind of 
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‘presidential minister.’ President Grybauskaitė 
also personally paid great attention to the 
energy sector: for example, the floating LNG 
terminal in Klaipėda port was known as 
‘Grybauskaitė’s project’ thanks to her persistent 
political support (and prodding of the 
government’s ministers as well as civil 
servants). Accordingly, a change in president 
can have a significant impact on Lithuania's 
energy policy priorities. 
However, during the most recent presidential 
campaign in 2019, energy security and climate 
policy topics were side-lined. The main areas of 
interest for the candidates and voters were 
economic and social questions, foreign policy 
issues and distribution of domestic political 
powers. The only topic related to energy 
security and environment 
to emerge during the 
debates was Lithuania’s 
potential response to the 
Astravyets NPP (also 
known by its Russian name 
Ostrovets) now under 
construction in Belarus. All three of the most 
popular candidates—Gitanas Nausėda 
(independent), Ingrida Šimonytė (Homeland 
Union-Lithuania’s Christian Democrats, TS-LKD), 
and Saulius Skvernelis (Lithuanian Farmers and 
Greens Union, LVŽS)—acknowledged the 
potential threat of Astravyets and pointed to 
alleged mistakes made both by President 
Grybauskaitė and by previous governments.  
Saulius Skvernelis, who has also served as 
Lithuania’s Prime Minister since 2016, declared 
during the presidential campaign that his 
government would “ensure and do everything 
possible to prevent this plant from becoming 
operational.”59 He had even sent a letter to the 
Belarusian authorities proposing that they 
consider the development of a modern gas 
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power plant instead of a nuclear facility.60 
However, this idea was not only ignored by 
Minsk, but became an object of some mockery 
in Lithuania. For his part, Gitanas Nausėda 
called for an effort to convince Lithuania’s 
neighbours that Astravyets is unsafe and poses 
a threat to them as well, while at the same time 
acknowledging that contacts with Belarus 
should remain open. Ingrida Šimonytė 
emphasised that Lithuania needs to ensure that 
electricity from the plant does not enter the 
Lithuanian and EU market, 
suggesting that this be done by 
creating a coalition of several 
like-minded countries. 
Synchronisation of the 
electricity grid with continental 
Europe was occasionally 
mentioned during the presidential campaign, 
albeit mostly in relation to the Astravyets 
question. For example, Saulius Skvernelis 
observed that desynchronisation is the best 
way to stop Belarusian electricity from entering 
the Lithuanian (and Baltic) electricity market.  
Climate policy was almost a non-issue during 
the campaign. Only when answering specific 
questions did Gitanas Nausėda mention recent 
EU initiatives to address climate change. He 
declared that “the initiative by the President 
Macron to create a European climate bank can 
be considered and welcomed.” He also called 
on Lithuania to set an ambitious goal: obtaining 
100% of energy consumption from 
renewables.61 
The relatively low political profile of energy, 
environment and climate policy issues is not 
unexpected. Lithuanian society pays little 
attention to these topics. A June 2019 
Eurobarometer survey indicated that only 4% of 
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Lithuanians cited "environmental, climate and 
energy issues" as among the most important for 
their country at the moment—compared to an 
EU average of  20%.62 On the other hand, 
Lithuanians are aware that climate change is 
among the most important issues faced by the 
EU as a whole (22% mentioned the topic—the 
same figure as the EU average). 
Neither the presidential election—which 
Gitanas Nausėda won after the second round of 
balloting in May 2019—nor the cabinet 
reshuffle later that year (which brought some 
minor new parties into the governing 
coalition)—led to any significant changes to 
Lithuania’s energy or climate policy. The 
existing government programme (dating to 
2016) was not even updated; Žygimantas 
Vaičiūnas remained in position as energy 
minister, tasked with further implementation of 
the energy strategy from 2018.  
The National Energy Independence Strategy of 
2018 finally abandons the long-time goal of 
restoring nuclear generating capacity to 
Lithuania, instead focusing on the development 
of RES. It establishes some ambitious energy 
security and climate targets: first, to gradually 
replace electricity import with local electricity 
generation (in 2030, according to this plan, 
domestic electricity generation should account 
for 70% of final consumption, rising to 100% by 
2050). Second, it sets the goal of having 80% of 
the country’s energy needs generated from 
non-polluting (zero-emission sources, both of 
greenhouse gases and of air pollutants) by 
2050.63 Currently, electricity imports represent 
about 70-80% of all domestic needs; due to  
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inefficient and costly traditional power plants, 
however, domestic generation does now come 
only from renewables (mainly wind).  
At the moment, Minister of Energy Vaičiūnas is 
the leading figure in Lithuanian energy and 
climate change policy. Despite being an 
independent, he enjoys full trust of Prime 
Minister Skvernelis; the summer 2019 cabinet 
reshuffle did not affect his position. While 
Prime Minister Skvernelis and then-President 
Grybauskaitė closely monitored (and actively 
engaged in) bilateral and EU negotiations on 
synchronisation, the Ministry of Energy is by far 
the main player on the energy agenda. 
Even climate policy issues lie more 
within the scope of the Ministry of 
Energy than the Ministry of 
Environment (moreover, Vaičiūnas also 
served as acting Minister of 
Environment for four months in 2018-
2019).64 While the Lithuanian 
Parliament (Seimas) does not possess 
any significant political influence in 
shaping energy and climate policy, its 
committees do occasionally organise public 
hearings on some of the more pressing issues. 
President Gitanas Nausėda seems to be taking 
the topics of energy and climate change 
seriously. He established a new, separate 
environment and infrastructure group of 
advisors that coordinate energy, environmental 
and transport issues. Former energy minister 
Jaroslav Neverovič (Jarosław Niewierowicz) was 
appointed as the head of this group, which is 
also comprised of some senior officials on 
secondment from the energy as well as 
transport ministries. 
President Nausėda made his first international 
appearance on the topic of climate change in 
September 2019 at the Climate Action 
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Summit—one of the key high-level events of 
the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly. 
As Neverovič explained in an interview for this 
report, the Lithuanian president’s appearance 
at this summit as a speaker was the head of 
state’s own initiative, and was achieved only 
after some diplomatic effort. The president 
introduced Lithuania’s Transition to 
Sustainable Heating Global Initiative aimed at 
reducing the use of fossil fuels in centralised 
district heating and at delivering carbon 
neutrality. This initiative has already been 
supported by Austria, Georgia, Latvia, Sweden 
and Ukraine. As President Nausėda observed, 
"[i]n Lithuania, the share of biomass in 
residential district heating has increased from 
30 to 70 percent over the last five years, while 
at the same time the average heating prices 
have fallen by 30 to 40 percent."65 This has 
been emphasised by the president as one of 
Lithuania’s most impressive achievements for 
transition to sustainable environment. The new 
president also declared that Lithuania fully 
supports a transition to renewables and urged 
energy consumers to become energy 
prosumers, that is, consumers who generate 
energy for their own needs 
One of the main tasks of President Nausėda, as 
his advisors stress, is forging a new National 
Agreement on Climate Policy that could be 
announced in 2020. The initial idea was to link it 
to the public presentation of the National 
Integrated Energy and Climate Plan presented 
to the European Commission in the end of 
2019. However, according to some other 
sources, the launch of this agreement, was 
postponed perhaps until after a new 
government is formed following the next 
parliamentary elections in autumn 2020, as the 
                                                          
65 “The President introduced Lithuania’s new global initiative at the UN 
Climate Action Summit,” Office of the President of Lithuania, President’s 
Communication Group, 30 September 2019. 
present governing coalition in Lithuania seems 
to be unable to reach consensus with the 
opposition on many long-term strategic issues. 
The agreement would include some major 
targets on reducing CO2 emissions and 
transitioning to renewables. Neverovič 
confirmed that President Nausėda is keen on 
Lithuania joining the other EU nations that seek 
to become carbon neutral by 2050; however, 
he also explained that the president does not 
want to make such a commitment before the 
government makes the necessary decisions. 
As for other priorities, the presidential advisor 
pointed to the synchronisation issue. According 
to Neverovič, President Nausėda intends to 
accelerate the process leading 
up to the final synchronisation 
with continental Europe—and to 
set a target of 2024 instead of 
the current date of 2025. 
However, he struggled to 
explain how this would be 
realistic, bearing in mind the 
complexity of this process and 
the involvement of other 
countries (Estonia, Latvia and Poland). As 
Minister of Energy Vaičiūnas made it clear in 
the interview for this report, it would be almost 
impossible to build the Harmony Link between 
Lithuania and Poland—a crucial element in the 
synchronisation project—any faster. (Harmony 
Link is a new Polish-Lithuanian submarine high-
voltage direct current, or HVDC, cable project, 
adopted in 2018 as a compromise with Poland, 
which strongly opposed the Lithuanian original 
proposal of a second high-voltage alternating 
current (HVAC) overland electricity connection 
between the two countries.) According to 
experts, an additional electricity connection 
between Lithuania and Poland is an essential 
element of the synchronisation process due to 
security and stability reasons. The estimated 
cost of Harmony Link is about €650-700 million; 
it is anticipated that the European Commission 
will provide 75 percent of the funding. 
However, in a private conversation, a 
representative from the Lithuanian TSO Litgrid 
noted that, according to information received 
from the Polish side, this undersea cable may 
actually become fully operational only in 2027. 
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Some suggestions to further decrease the 
maintenance cost of the Klaipėda LNG 
terminal is also on the president’s agenda. 
Neverovič explained that it would be wise to 
seek long-term contracts now—with natural gas 
prices at record lows—as well as to take over 
some operational functions of the terminal 
from the current Norwegian operator company, 
Hoegh LNG.  
President Nausėda has already joined the 
Lithuanian government in attempts to gain 
support from other EU members for boycotting 
the import of electricity from Astravyets. 
Meeting with the Latvian President Egils Levits 
in Vilnius (on 3 October 2019), President 
Nausėda gave special attention to the safety of 
the Astravyets project (according to Neverovič, 
the Lithuanian president made a half-hour 
presentation to his colleague on this issue). The 
president’s advisory team is preparing draft 
legislation aimed at revoking the licences of 
companies involved in electricity deals with 
Belarus after the Astravyets NPP launch.  
Energy and climate policy in general is not a top 
priority for the current government. Except for 
the Astravyets NPP issue, all other questions 
are discussed primarily in small ‘bubbles’ of 
experts, or in specific businesses and 
government institutions. A short-lasting 
political discussion did begin 
after a 2019 proposal to 
introduce a new pollution tax on 
vehicles. However, the poorly-
articulated proposal was rejected 
by the Seimas on the first 
reading. As far as the Lithuanian 
public is concerned, there are no 
pressing concerns about energy 
and climate change issues. That 
said, however, there is growing concern among 
governmental institutions and experts that 
Lithuania’s energy transition is unbalanced: its 
rapid move towards renewable sources of 
electricity generation has not been matched by 
commensurate progress in such sectors as 
agriculture or transport—while much remains 
to be done in increasing energy efficiency.  
In June 2019, the European Commission issued 
recommendations to Lithuania about the 
actions it should take in order to meet EU goals 
on climate change and energy policy. Its main 
recommendations included:  
 Continuing to refine the national energy 
strategy in order to achieve 2030 
greenhouse gas reduction targets for 
sectors not covered by the ETS. As the 
most problematic sectors in Lithuania 
are transport and agriculture, the 
Commission suggests that Lithuania 
specify its planned policy measures in a 
more detailed way; 
 While welcoming Lithuania's ambition 
to achieve a 45% share of renewable 
energy in its energy mix by 2030, the 
Commission recommends basing this 
goal on comprehensive and 
quantifiable policies and measures that 
comply with the obligations set out in 
Directive (EU) 2018/20018 of the 
European Parliament and European 
Council; 
 Significantly raising Lithuania’s ambition 
to reduce final and primary energy 
consumption by 2030,  while proposing 
more ambitious policies and measures 
to save even more energy in order to 
meet the EU’s 2030 energy efficiency 
target; 
 Identifying measures that will 
contribute to energy security 
objectives, including diversifying energy 
import sources while reducing energy 
dependency.66 
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These recommendations were advanced at an 
inopportune time—during the above-
mentioned reconfiguration of the governing 
coalition that followed the presidential 
elections. In this context, especially given that 
the president-elect had yet to 
be sworn in, hardly anyone 
outside the Ministry of Energy 
even took note of these 
recommendations, let alone 
used them as an opportunity to 
enhance public discussion on 
energy and climate issues. The 
reshuffled government largely continued its 
previous policies in the absence of significant 
internal pressure to do otherwise. 
In July 2017, the Seimas passed a law 
prohibiting the purchase of electricity from 
unsafe third-country nuclear power plants.67 
This is the main legal framework for Lithuania’s 
current position towards the Astravyets project. 
While Poland has also decided not to buy 
electricity from Belarus, Minsk officially sees no 
problems with the Lithuanian legislation; it 
hopes that electricity from the plant will reach 
the Nord Pool market through Latvia.68 As soon 
as Lithuania stopped its electricity trade with 
Belarus, the Latvian transmission system 
operator AST announced its intent to continue 
providing access to electricity from third 
countries. Former Lithuanian energy minister 
Arvydas Sekmokas argued in an interview for 
this report that if purchases are made by the 
Latvians, electricity from Astravyets will 
technically flow through Lithuania. 
Lithuania is pursuing a two-track policy in trying 
to avoid potential manipulation of the 
electricity trade with Belarus. First, President 
Nausėda has prepared draft legislation enabling 
the government to suspend licenses of 
electricity traders involved in imports from 
Belarus, as noted above. Second, the Ministry 
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of Energy continues to seeking a formal 
reaction from the EU.  
In May 2019, Lithuania formally called on the 
European Commission to ensure the 
implementation of the recommendations of the 
Astravyets NPP stress test. In a meeting with 
Maroš Šefčovič (then Commission Vice 
President responsible for the Energy Union), 
Minister of Energy Vaičiūnas delivered a formal 
letter urging the EU and its institutions to take a 
principled stance requiring Belarus immediately 
to develop an action plan for implementing the 
stress test recommendations, while also 
developing a comprehensive EU action plan for 
the Astravyets project as a whole. As Vaičiūnas 
declared after the meeting: 
Thanks to the [Commission's’] involvement, 
Belarus has succeeded in conducting the 
stress test according to EU methodology. 
Now, a strong Commission leadership and  
principled position are needed to ensure 
that Belarus does not start the operation of 
the Astravyets NPP until the stress test 
recommendations are implemented. 
Otherwise, the entire Astravyets NPP’s 
stress test procedure will have been 
meaningless—a mere simulated effort 
without any result. It is a question of the 
security of EU citizens; there can be no 
compromise on this issue.
69
 
At the same time, Lithuanian politicians 
continued blaming each other for allowing the 
building of the Astravyets NPP in the first place. 
The opposition TS-LKD, for instance, accused 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevičius (and 
indirectly, President Nausėda) for trying to find 
a dialogue with Belarus at the cost of softening 
Lithuania’s position on the Astravyets project. 
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Lithuania’s government has repeatedly declared 
that the synchronisation project has moved 
from the political to the technical stage and is 
irreversible. In March 2019 in Brussels, the 
heads of the Baltic electricity transmission 
system operators as well as the head of the 
EU’s Executive Agency for Innovation and 
Network Programmes signed a financing 
agreement in which the Commission will 
allocate €324 million in Connecting Europe 
Facility (CEF) funding to the three Baltic states. 
This includes €125.2 million (three-quarters of 
the required amount) for the renewal and 
strengthening of the Lithuanian electricity 
system. 
In April 2019, the government approved the 
draft Law on the Interconnection of the 
Lithuanian Electricity System with the 
Continental European Networks, along with 
related legal acts. Passed by the Seimas in June, 
these laws provide the basic conditions for 
organising and implementing the 
synchronisation process.  
The next month, the Continental Europe 
Regional Group of the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
(ENTSO-E) announced that the relevant TSOs 
had signed a Connection Agreement. This is a 
409-point set of technical and practical 
standards and indicators of operation that will 
enable Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to connect 
and operate on the same frequency as the 
Continental European power grid. At present, 
the Lithuanian power system meets around 40 
percent (169) of these standards, with similar 
figures for Latvia and Estonia.70 
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Progress continued in July, when the Ministry of 
Energy released its plan to carry out 
synchronisation measures. According to the 
ministry, one essential task is the installation of 
synchronous compensators in transmission 
networks. This will be implemented in two 
stages, with the first to be completed by the 
end of 2022 and the second by the end of 2024. 
During the second phase, Lithuania will also 
have to implement frequency system stability 
assessment and install automatic generation 
control tools.71 The plan was approved by the 
government in September 2019. 
Despite these regular steps forward, public 
discussion on synchronisation is rather minimal; 
only some technical press releases and 
information sheets appear in the media. In 
principle, this supports the government’s 
contention that the synchronisation process is 
becoming a technical one.  
However, as Minister of Energy 
Vaičiūnas argued, risks associated 
with synchronisation project still 
exist—both domestic and 
international. Domestically, there 
are political pressures (especially 
from the opposition TS-LKD) to 
ensure that electricity from 
Astravyets does not enter the Lithuanian 
electricity market. Some politicians are even 
questioning the above-mentioned technical 
efforts to strengthen the electricity grid in 
northern Lithuania. For the moment, Lithuania 
remains part of the BRELL ring with Belarus and 
Russia; its TSO, Litgrid, is responsible for 
ensuring the safe transmission of power. 
However, after the parliamentary elections this 
year, a new government might be willing to 
revise the already-approved plans to strengthen 
the transmission system as means to block 
Belarusian exports to Latvia, thereby delaying 
the desynchronisation process. Even without 
political interference, there could be technical 
or bureaucratic delays (associated, for example, 
with public procurement) that could push the 
2025 target date of Baltic synchronisation with 
the Continental European system further back.  
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Another issue is related to the process of 
desynchronisation from the BRELL system. So 
far, there are no clear technical conditions or 
requirements on how the desynchronisation 
should look like. Lithuania hopes that these 
conditions will be purely technical in nature, 
but there is a risk that some political demands 
from Russia and Belarus could also be included.  
One of the most challenging issues for 
Lithuania’s energy sector is the high ongoing 
maintenance and operational costs of Klaipėda 
LNG terminal. Currently, the annual 
maintenance cost is about €63 
million, including interest payments. 
The main consumer of this gas is 
currently the fertiliser producer 
Achema, which in 2018 obtained 
about 63% of the gas imported via the 
facility. Achema is thus paying the 
largest share of the so-called ‘security tax’ on 
the gas price—about €20 million euros per 
year. However, the very continued existence of 
the company has recently been called into 
question. The company’s financial losses were 
about €28 million in 2018—due not only to the 
higher gas prices it pays, but also the increasing 
cost of CO2 emission allowances under the EU 
ETS. If Achema entered bankruptcy or closed, 
the LNG terminal thus would suffer 
dramatically. Moreover, a hypothetical closure 
of the company could have significant social 
and economic impact; at its main fertiliser plant 
alone, Achema employs about 1,300 people. 
Several hundred more work for other parts of 
the Achema business group, which is among the 
biggest contributors to the national budget. 
Accordingly, the Lithuanian government is now 
looking for ways to reduce the ‘security taxes’ 
paid by Achema and other LNG customers. 
In December 2018, the Seimas 
approved the government’s 
proposal to purchase the LNG 
terminal in order to optimise 
maintenance costs between 2020 
and 2044.72 This decision also means 
that the LNG terminal will continue 
its operation after 2024, the date 
when its initial 10-year lease was 
slated to end. Later, in May 2019, the terminal’s 
operator Klaipėdos Nafta received permission 
from the European Commission to reduce costs 
of terminal maintenance for consumers. 
Borrowing from banks and spreading the 
terminal’s maintenance costs over 25 years 
should reduce yearly maintenance expenditures 
by 40% (some €23-25 million).73 However, 
critics argue that this decision will only 
postpone the payment of maintenance costs to 
a future time—at which there is no guarantee 
of stable gas demand. 
The paradox is that the LNG terminal does not 
facilitate operation of Lithuanian gas-fired 
power plants even in the current 
period of low gas prices. Due to the 
high terminal maintenance costs, 
the country’s gas-fired power plants 
avoid purchasing LNG, as they would 
then have to pay the ‘security tax’, 
increasing the price of electricity. 
Therefore, the 9th block of the Elektrėnai 
power plant is not operating, even though 
Lithuania has invested hundreds of millions of 
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euro in its modernisation. On the other hand, 
Latvia buys gas from the Lithuanian LNG 
terminal, evades the ‘security tax’ (which 
applies to domestic consumers only), produces 
electricity in gas-fired power plants and sells it 
to Lithuania. During 2018, 80% of Lithuanian 
electricity demand was met by imports. 
Lithuania is still negotiating the specific 
conditions for joining the common Baltic-
Finnish gas market. Lithuanian gas transmission 
system operator Amber Grid argues that 
Lithuania is not abandoning its plans to enter 
the regional market—which remains a strategic 
goal—but wants this  to be done on mutually 
beneficial terms. It seems that the LNG terminal 
is the largest obstacle to market entry.  
According to the principle of a common market, 
consumers pay the same price for gas inside the 
market regardless of its entry point. Lithuania 
has the most gas entry points of the three Baltic 
states; in addition to the terminal, it is 
connected by pipeline to Belarus, and soon 
(starting potentially in 2022) to 
Poland. In April 2019, Lithuania 
proposed three principles: zero tax 
at the interconnection point 
between Latvia and Lithuania, the 
same price at the entry point with 
Belarus that Latvia, Estonia and 
Finland have at their entry points, 
and a 75% discount at the Klaipėda 
terminal entry point.74 In other words, Lithuania 
still wants to keep some trading margin for 
imported LNG via the terminal—something it 
will likely continue to insist on until a way to 
manage the LNG terminal’s maintenance costs 
is found.  
In April 2019, the Ministry of Energy decided to 
provide financial support for installations of 
small solar power plants (up to 10 kilowatts 
[kW]) to individual homeowners who want to 
generate electricity for their own needs. The 
total cost of this subsidy—which gives 
individuals €323 per kilowatt of power—was 
estimated at around €4.5 million for the 
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prisijungimo prie bendros dujų rinkos” [Lithuania continues negotiations on 
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remainder of last year; there is also a plan to 
invest more than €16 million euro of EU funds 
in solar power by 2023.75 This decision is a part 
of a broader programme to increase the 
number of prosumers. According to Minister of 
Energy Vaičiūnas, this has been rapidly 
increasing: from 9,000 in 2018 to 20,000 by 
September 2019. 
A new model for renewable energy 
development also made its debut in Lithuania in 
2019, according to which state support for 
renewable power plants will be distributed 
through technology-neutral auctions. (The 
previous renewable electricity production 
auctions were held in 2015). In April 2019, the 
European Commission announced its approval 
of this state support programme, which has a 
total budget of €385 million over the 12-year 
period established by EU guidelines. As 
highlighted above, Lithuania is seeking to 
increase the share of renewable energy in its 
electricity balance to 45% by 2030.  
The first auction took place in September 2019 
and resulted in a pledge by the winner to 
provide 0.3TWh of new, state-supported 
renewable energy production capacity. The 
producer will receive a premium over the 
market price—in September 2019, this was 
€3.86 per megawatt-hour (MWh) (as it was the 
case for the first auction). However, the 
maximum price for electricity from renewable 
sources should be no higher than 
€48.93/MWh.76 The programme continues to 
enjoy strong political support; the national 
regulatory authority is planning to organise 
three more such auctions this year. 
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The key issue regarding regional cooperation 
for Lithuania at the moment is finding a 
common position with Latvia and Estonia on 
boycotting Belarusian electricity imports after 
the Astravyets NPP comes online. 
Announcements from Latvia that it would buy 
Belarusian or Russian electricity even after 
Lithuania stopped trading with Belarus were 
seen quite negatively in Vilnius.  However, 
there are many technical and commercial 
questions about whether Latvia could 
implement its intentions in practice, especially 
given the above-mentioned Lithuanian law 
forbidding market traders from importing 
electricity generated in unsafe power plants. 
Another cooperation issue is related to 
synchronisation project. Baltic electricity TSOs 
have postponed an isolated operation test of 
the Baltic power system 
that was previously 
scheduled for June 2019; 
no clear date for the 
rescheduled test has yet 
been announced. An 
isolated operation test is 
a required step in the 
preparation to disconnect from the BRELL 
system and synchronise with the Continental 
Europe electricity grid. While Litgrid carried out 
its own test in May 2019, the postponement of 
the Baltic test has raised suspicions in Vilnius 
that the synchronisation project may be 
experiencing unannounced other problems. 
Despite potential difficulties with Lithuania’s 
Baltic neighbours, cooperation with Poland on 
electricity issues—and in energy more 
broadly—continues to increase. After 
successfully finding a compromise on 
synchronisation options in 2018, the two 
countries have no energy disputes at the 
moment. Lithuania appreciates Poland’s 
decision not to buy electricity from Belarus in 
the future, while the two countries continue to 
work to complete the Gas Interconnector 
Poland-Lithuania (GIPL) pipeline as soon as 
possible. 
In 2019, Lithuania forged credible ties with the 
leadership of the US Department of Energy. The 
second meeting of the Partnership for 
Transatlantic Energy Cooperation (P-TEC) 
brought high-level delegations from the US 
(including then-Secretary of Energy Rick Perry) 
and the EU to Vilnius in October 2019. 
The event followed on the first P-TEC 
forum, which attracted a great deal of 
attention at its Houston launch in 
March of that year. Minister of Energy 
Vaičiūnas subsequently devoted 
considerable effort to bring the 
second forum to Vilnius—resulting in 
the signing of a joint declaration 
between Secretary Perry and his ministerial 
counterparts from the Baltic states. The 
declaration acknowledges "a critical moment 
for the Baltic states in strengthening the 
cybersecurity in strategic Baltic energy 
infrastructure" and describes the "crucial role 
that the US could play in assisting the Baltic 
states with strategic and technical support."77 
After the event, Vaičiūnas stressed that 
Lithuania values the possibility of import LNG 
from the US at a competitive price; LNG cargoes 
from the United States have already been 
delivered twice to the Klaipėda terminal. 
However, the US representatives were very 
cautious in expressing support for Lithuania’s 
position regarding the safety of the Astravyets 
NPP. When asked about the topic, Secretary 
Perry suggested only that Lithuania must 
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continue dialogue with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and Belarus, adding that 
the US will stay out of talks on the issue.78 
The implementation of strategic energy 
projects and the national energy strategy may 
suffer from Lithuania’s current lack of political 
stability. The government still has a very fragile 
majority in the parliament and cannot always 
be sure that its draft laws will be approved—as 
happened with its abortive effort to introduce a 
pollution tax on cars in October 2019. The 
government’s defeat means that even modest 
progress at reducing emissions from the 
transport sector is unlikely in the near future, 
raising the prospect of fines from the European 
Commission if Lithuania is unable to meet its 
greenhouse gas reduction targets.  
As the country is about to enter a new political 
cycle this summer in advance of parliamentary 
elections scheduled for October 2020, the 
primary focus of the election campaign is likely 
to be the government’s record of managing the 
coronavirus pandemic and its severe economic 
fallout. Energy and climate policies—beyond 
the already existing themes covered in this 
chapter—are unlikely to emerge as major 
political agenda items around which battles for 
votes will concentrate. Unless the energy 
transition takes a very prominent seat in the 
EU’s post-pandemic recovery programme—and 
thus draws greater political interest from the 
political parties and pressure groups in how 
better to capitalise on it—Lithuania’s domestic 
political competition is not about to become a 
major driver of further change in the country’s 
energy and climate policy directions and 
ambitions.  
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Latvia's energy sector reached its 2020 target of 
obtaining 40% of its electricity production from 
the renewable sources in 2018—two years 
ahead of schedule.79 Hydropower has 
traditionally constituted the most significant 
renewable energy source for electricity 
production (2.4 terawatt-hours, or TWh, in 
2018, compared to 3.1 TWh in 2008, but 
electricity production from biofuels grew from 
just 44 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 2008 to 944 
GWh in 2010—while growth in the use of 
biofuels and biogas in heat generation was even 
more impressive, rising from 4,233 terajoules 
(TJ) in 2008 to 13,854 TJ in 
2018.80 Visible progress has been 
slower in the utilisation of solar 
and wind power;  electricity 
production from wind has 
doubled since 2008 to a still 
modest but already important 
122 GWh.81 On the other hand, 
in the total primary energy 
supply, petroleum products still 
represent about 31%, while 
natural gas makes up around 26%.82 In this 
segment, Latvia is fully dependent on exporting 
countries not only in terms of supplies, but also 
of infrastructure and transport routes.  
Latvia’s economy has one of the lowest carbon 
intensity figures—measured in tonnes of CO2 
equivalent per capita—in the EU (6.1 t, 
compared to an EU average of 8.9 t).83 
Consequently, the (legally binding) national 
emissions reduction target was set at 6% of 
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2005 levels by 2030.84 From 2018 onwards, 
however, the target is a 12.5% reduction, a very 
serious task that requires broader progress in 
the country’s energy transition and economic 
transformation. 
Latvian power plants have been almost 
completely renovated since 2005. Hydro plants 
on the Daugava River have their installed 
capacity of 1,554 MW with normalised (average 
long term) yearly production of 2.7 TWh. 
Meanwhile, three new combined cycle gas 
turbine (CCGT) new natural gas stations were 
brought online in 2005, 2009 and 2013, with 
respective capacities of 144 MW, 440 MW and 
440 MW.85 These are very important elements 
of the common electricity system of the Baltic 
states. In practice, Latvia is 
able to generate enough 
electricity to balance its 
consumption nearly 100% of 
the time. In 2018, it was able 
to satisfy 90% of national 
electricity demand with domestic production; 
this figure fell to 84% in the first nine months of 
2019 as drier weather conditions limited hydro 
capacity.86 
Significant progress has also been made in 
strengthening the national electricity grid and 
its linkages with neighbouring Estonia and 
Lithuania. This is important in two regards. 
First, it enables larger-scale adoption of 
renewable sources of energy such as solar and 
wind. For example, in November 2019, a new 
207km-long 330 kV power line along Latvia’s 
Baltic and Gulf of Riga coastline became 
operational.87 This opens up the possibility to 
harness at least 500 MW of onshore and 
offshore wind energy. A further 300 MW will 
become possible after the completion of a 
power line between Riga and Kilingi-Nõmme in 
Estonia.  
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Second, it is an important step in preparing for 
the synchronisation of the Baltic power grid 
with the Continental European system in 2025. 
As noted earlier in the report, the European 
Commission’s CEF has provided the largest 
possible funding share (75%) for the first phase 
of the project, with Latvia receiving around €58 
million. As part of its second phase—estimated 
to cost around €1.2 billion—almost €100 million 
will be invested in Latvia to strengthen the 
national grid and cross-border 
interconnections.88 
In terms of gas supply, the Klaipėda LNG 
terminal in Lithuania is becoming an important 
element in Latvia’s gas transmission system; it 
has led to increased utilisation of the Inčukalns 
underground gas storage facility in Latvia. As of 
November 2019, this terminal was the biggest 
gas delivery point for the Baltics—larger than 
the pipelines from Russia. Throughout 2019, 
trade in natural gas across the Lithuanian-
Latvian border was significantly more active 
due to the favourable situation on global LNG 
markets. Thus, the ratio between deliveries to 
the Latvian gas transmission system from 
Klaipėda and Russia reached 1:4 (compared to 
2:98 in 2018); meanwhile, the utilisation rate of 
the Inčukalns facility reached 75% in October 
2019, compared to 54% the previous year.89 
Given the steady improvement in Latvia’s 
energy security in recent years, and in light of 
the fact that key decisions such as 
synchronisation with the Continental European 
grid had been finally agreed, energy issues did 
not feature high on the parliamentary election 
campaign agenda in 2018. Climate issues, 
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carbon neutrality and the energy transition also 
were absent from the discussion. At the same 
time, according to Eurobarometer, just over 
50% of Latvians say they are very or somewhat 
concerned about climate—a result that has 
remained steady for the past dozen years.90 
However, one aspect of national energy policy 
that is directly related to the climate change 
and energy transition issues did stand out in the 
run-up to the elections:  support for renewable 
energy development, natural gas cogeneration 
of electricity and operational support of large 
(above 100 MW) CCGT generators—all of which 
ultimately is paid for by the end consumers of 
electricity. Armed with Eurostat electricity price 
breakdown information, the political opposition 
launched a sustained campaign against these 
three aid methods—employing statistical 
comparisons with other EU Member States 
showing Latvia at the very top in terms of aid 
provided. Moreover, the industry insisted that 
only households must pay for renewable energy 
support. 
In reality, Latvian law has been clear on the 
intensity of support, timeframe, application and 
procedures for granting this aid, thereby 
reassuring industrial investors. Except for 
hydroelectric power plants on the Daugava, all 
of Latvia’s more than 400 power plants have 
received (and continue to receive) support in 
the form of feed-in tariffs or capacity payments. 
After the end of the permissible state aid 
period, however, they are supposed to switch 
market conditions. Such aid has been declared 
compatible with the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union by the European 
Commission. However, criticism of support—
whether due to principled disagreement, issues 
in implementation, or irregularities in operation 
of the power plants concerned—continued to 
persist, and large segments of the price-
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sensitive electorate supported abolishing the 
aid programme. 
As a result, every new Latvian government 
faced a wave of inquiries and legal requests 
from the Saeima (parliament) opposition, 
regardless of the new composition of the ruling 
coalition after the elections. 
Through traditional and online 
social media channels, the 
issue continued to afflict 
national energy policy as well 
as domestic politics more 
generally. A special 
investigative committee was 
formed in the Saeima to determine the answers 
to three questions; whether the aid 
programmes have been conducted in 
accordance with national and EU legislation, 
whether there has been any corruption and 
whether there has been any economic damage. 
With high-profile figures such as government 
ministers—including the prime minister—called 
to testify, this ensured that an issue carried 
over from the previous parliamentary term 
remained at the centre of political and public 
attention in 2019. The broader implication is 
that this highly-charged political context may 
negatively affect the overall long-term 
sentiment towards policies designed to provide 
financial incentives for completing the country’s 
energy transition and achieving carbon 
neutrality goals. 
The Saeima elections in October 2018 resulted 
in a very fragmented parliament that struggled 
to form a viable majority to govern. Its 
difficulties also partly stemmed from the effort 
to build a cordon sanitaire around Harmony—
the party that won the largest number of seats, 
but which is often deemed pro-Russia in its 
views and external links—in order to prevent it 
from joining (or even leading) the Latvian 
government.91 After long negotiations and two 
attempts to nominate a prime minister, an 
agreement was reached at the end of January 
2019. The new coalition includes 
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representatives of five political factions: three 
centre-right parties (New Unity, New 
Conservatives and Development/For!), one 
national conservative party (National Alliance) 
and most—though not all—deputies from the 
populist Who Owns the State?/KPV party. The 
pervasive criticism of the power plant support 
programme described above created some 
dramatic moments in the coalition-building 
talks, and Who Owns the State?/KPV splintered, 
as some of its representatives voted against 
approving the new government.92 
The new cabinet is headed by Prime Minister 
Krišjānis Kariņš (New Unity), who began his 
political career as minister of economy and 
gained political experience as a two-term 
member of the European Parliament. The 
Latvian government's programme of action in 
the energy sector does not contain any 
dramatic changes to the 
general objectives of its 
predecessors—with one 
exception. It promises to 
eliminate existing aid for 
renewable energy and natural 
gas cogeneration plants, while 
also abolishing capacity 
support to existing large gas-
fuelled production facilities. 
The challenge will lie in 
fulfilling this promise in a legally correct 
manner, without causing financial damage to 
investors or deterring them from financing 
further power generation capacity 
improvements, especially from renewable 
sources. The Ministry of Economy has recently 
been instructed by the prime minister to 
commence work immediately on a new 
mandatory procurement component (MPC) 
monitoring project, albeit with a view to 
eventually abolishing this component as 
stipulated in the government’s programme.93  
In the meantime, the above-mentioned Saiema 
special committee investigating support 
payments to power plants completed its work 
in February 2020. After having heard the 
testimonies of 53 officials—cabinet ministers, 
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senior civil servants and energy experts—it 
found that no wrongdoing or corrupt intent 
could be established, although it concluded that 
governments in office since 2005 have failed to 
adjust the country’s regulatory framework to 
changing external conditions. Although the 
report echoed the government’s most recent 
instructions to the Ministry of Economy, which 
it called on to “immediately develop and 
present to the Saeima a legal framework 
repealing the mandatory purchasing system,” it 
did note that revocation of the law would not 
affect already concluded contracts for which 
development permits have been granted and 
substantial/irreversible investments have 
already been made.94 It remains to be seen 
whether these latter conditions will be 
sufficient to assuage either investors or the 
political opposition. 
Regardless of a high degree of continuity in the 
overall energy strategy, it can be concluded 
from the prime minister’s public statements 
that his government will seek to be a more 
active player in climate policy than its 
predecessors—despite the relative indifference 
of a large proportion of Latvian society. At the 
Sibiu informal European Council meeting in May 
2019 Prime Minister Kariņš said:   
Until now, Latvia has been passively 
involved in the implementation of climate 
policy. We must radically change the 
approach: from a country that reluctantly 
accepts another one, to a country that is 
one of the main drivers of climate policy in 
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Regardless of a high degree of continuity in the overall 
energy strategy, it can be concluded from the prime 
minister’s public statements that his government will 
seek to be a more active player in climate policy than its 
predecessors—despite the relative indifference of a 
large proportion of Latvian society 
  
 
  
the European Union. Latvia joins the 
European Union group of Member States, 
which believes that Europe needs to 
address climate change seriously and 
devote more resources to tackling this 
global challenge. It is also our opportunity – 
with the help of total European Union 
investments in cohesion policy, to 
substantially transform Latvia's economy so 
that it can create and offer a variety of 
technological solutions and services to 
tackle climate change at global level.
95 
During this meeting, Latvia joined Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden in 
calling on the EU to pursue a more ambitious 
strategy to deal with climate change—a call 
that served as a precursor to the European 
Green Deal rolled out by the new European 
Commission after the European Parliament 
elections in autumn 2019. Subsequently, Latvia 
announced its support for the EU target of 
achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. In this 
context, a small but important step was made 
by the present coalition as an immediate short-
term measure within the framework of the 
national taxation legislation and budget 
process: a gradual increase in the CO2 tax from 
€4.5 per tonne in 2019 to €15 in 2022.96  
In November 2019, the government established 
a National Council for Energy and Climate. This 
represents a big step forward in bringing 
together various stakeholders to discuss 
challenges, build consensus, coordinate actions 
and provide inputs into national decision-
making. The council includes the prime 
minister, the ministers of environment, 
economy, finance, transport and agriculture as 
well as representatives of various state 
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agencies, businesses and the non-governmental 
sector. One of its first meetings focused on 
wind energy and sought to provide input into 
the National Energy and Climate Plan 2021-
2030.  
The latest iteration of the National Energy and 
Climate Plan 2021-2030—already drafted by 
the Kariņš government—takes into account the 
recommendations issued  by the European 
Commission in response to its 2018 version. The 
Commission’s main criticism of Latvia was 
about its low 2030 renewable energy target 
(originally set at only 45% of gross 
consumption. In the newly submitted draft, this 
figure was increased to 50%, made possible due 
to the plans to tap into both onshore and 
offshore wind potential and thereby bring an 
additional 800 MW of renewable energy 
capacity to the market (including through 
regional/cross-border projects such as a 
planned offshore windfarm in the Gulf of Riga, 
to be developed jointly with Estonia).97 The plan 
also envisages the promotion of renewables on 
the basis of market principles, without any 
specific state aid or consumer participation—a 
clear departure from current policy. However, it 
raises the possibility of auctions, in case market 
incentives prove insufficient at generating 
investor interest.98 
The plan also highlights the importance of 
regional cooperation in the context of the 
establishment of a single market for natural gas 
in Finland, Estonia and Latvia. In this regard, the 
government is still dealing with 
the legacy of a continuing 
failure to resolve the issue of 
ownership in its incumbent gas 
transmission system operator, 
Conexus Baltic Grid—which has 
resulted in considerably 
delayed implementation of the 
EU’s third energy package, 
notably its provisions related to the unbundling 
of gas transmission, distribution and sales 
ownership. This implementation is a critical 
issue for facilitating Latvia’s participation in the 
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The Latvian government is still dealing with the legacy 
of a continuing failure to resolve the issue of ownership 
in its incumbent gas transmission system operator—
which has resulted in considerably delayed 
implementation of the EU’s third energy package 
  
 
  
common regional gas market and ensuring fair 
competition among all market players.  
Last December, the Latvian energy regulator 
issued a warning to Conexus Baltic Grid: if 
Russia’s Gazprom (which owns 34.3% of shares) 
and Marguerite Gas I S.a.r.l. (holder of 29.06%) 
do not sell their shares by the end of 2019, the 
company—and not its individual shareholders—
could be subject to a fine of up to 10% of its 
annual income.99 This is the second step taken 
by the regulator; its previous 2018 effort was 
blocked when Conexus Baltic Grid challenged its 
demands in an administrative court. For its part, 
Gazprom claims that it has no control of the 
company, arguing that it abstains from 
supervisory board decisions and does not take 
part in any hiring or investment decisions—thus 
acting like any other minority shareholder. 
Meanwhile, Marguerite Gas’s 
main activities are gas 
distribution and sales; for such 
a company, ownership of the 
gas distribution network is a 
clear violation of the principles 
of the third energy package. As 
of this writing, Gazprom has 
yet to notify the Latvian government of the sale 
of its shares. However, there are some reports 
that a multinational investment firm intends to 
purchase the Russian firm’s stake in Conexus 
Baltic Grid.100 
The present Latvian government is fully 
committed to enhanced regional energy 
cooperation in strategic projects and policies, 
such as synchronisation of the Baltic power 
grids with the Continental European system, 
diversification of gas sources and supply routes, 
advancement of a common (Finland-Estonia-
Latvia) gas trading model and development of 
RES.  
 
 
                                                          
99
 “Nemiro: Latvia has not yet decided if it wants to acquire Gazprom’s 
shares in Conexus,” Baltic News Network/LETA, 4 December 2019.  
100 “Multinational fund might have won auction of Gazprom's shares in 
Latvia's Conexus,” The Baltic Course, 6 January 2020.  
Following the October 2019 amendments to the 
Energy Law of Latvia, the Latvian Public Utilities 
Commission approved Elering and Connexus 
Baltic Grid's Common Regulations for the Use of 
Natural Gas Transmission System in the 
common Latvia-Estonia entry-exit zone, as well 
as its Common Regulations for Natural Gas 
Balancing.101 These regulations have been in 
force since 1 January 2020. Latvia, Estonia and 
Finland have also agreed to establish a single 
input/output fee zone for natural gas 
transmission, eliminating any fees for gas flows 
crossing borders between these countries. 
Furthermore, the annual standard capacity 
product fee for output points with connections 
to transmission systems outside the unified 
area will be the same. By passing new 
legislation, Latvian authorities gave Conexus 
Baltic Grid full freedom to cooperate with the 
other national gas transmission system 
operators in the new common trading area.102  
Although Lithuania has not yet joined the 
integrated regional gas market, Latvia is keen to 
draw upon the opportunities to diversify gas 
supply routes through its southern neighbour. 
The Lithuanian-Latvian gas pipeline capacity-
building project is expected to be implemented 
by the end of 2023. This project will not only 
increase transmission capacity between 
Lithuania and Latvia, but it will also facilitate 
mutual access to the Klaipėda LNG terminal, the 
Latvian Inčukalns underground gas storage and 
the GIPL pipeline scheduled to begin operations 
in 2022. (The latter will also provide onward  
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access to networks, LNG import facilities and 
markets in continental Europe). The planned 
€10.2 million total investment in this project 
will increase the gas connection capacity to 
130.47 GWh per day (GWh/d) in the direction 
of Latvia (up from 67.6 GWh/d) and to 119.5 
GWh/d in the direction of Lithuania (which is 
currently 65.1 GWh per day).103 
Promising that progress will be closely 
monitored by the three governments, Prime 
Minister Kariņš has recently singled out the 
synchronisation of the Baltic grid with the 
Continental European electricity system as an 
absolute priority for regional cooperation.104 
With the project moving ahead, the Latvian 
government has since made steps to better 
define the rights, responsibilities and 
obligations of the national electricity TSO, 
Augstsprieguma Tīkls (AST). These steps aim to 
give it necessary operational freedom while 
preventing political interference with the 
implementation of specific technical objectives. 
The regulatory authority has also approved a 
Electricity Transmission System’s 2020-2029 
development plan for the TSO that includes 
measures and investments necessary for the 
successful implementation of Baltic 
synchronisation within the agreed 
timeframe.105 These steps should serve as 
reassurance that the actions of AST (e.g. its 
decision, together with Estonian TSO Elering, to 
postpone an isolated operation test of the 
Baltic system with Lithuania in mid-2019) are 
based on the TSO’s expert judgment and are 
not driven by political considerations or undue 
political interference. 
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One issue in regional energy security 
cooperation that does have a political 
dimension pertains to the Astravyets NPP and 
Lithuania’s goal of reaching common position 
among the Baltic states against importing 
power from the facility to the Nord Pool 
common regional electricity market. While 
Lithuania wishes to ban imports from this and 
other sources it deems unsafe, 
the Latvian Ministry of Economy 
articulated its position as follows: 
“With a view to reducing risks to a 
possible reduction in electricity 
flow or negative tariff increase, 
the cabinet supported the 
Ministry of Economy's offer to 
transfer this electricity trade to 
the Latvian border when Lithuania ceases to 
trade in electricity with Belarus. This solution 
will ensure that trading conditions with third 
countries continue to remain equivalent.”106 
Consequently, Riga is perceived by Vilnius as 
having failed to demonstrate solidarity with its 
southern neighbour’s security and geopolitical 
concerns. 
It remains to be seen whether and when the 
positions of Lithuania—on one hand—and 
Latvia as well as Estonia, on the other, will be 
successfully aligned. After the meeting of the 
three prime ministers in Tallinn in February 
2020, Lithuania’s Prime Minister Saulius 
Skvernelis expressed satisfaction that the three 
countries appeared to be moving closer to the 
common position and hoped that they would 
eventually identify an appropriate mechanism 
of controlling the origin of electricity entering 
the Baltic grid from third countries.107 Still, it 
remains a thorny issue in the bilateral and 
regional relations that has the potential to 
fragment the region’s energy security. Now, 
Lithuania (together with Poland) is adopting a 
more geopolitical perspective that requires an 
assertive and sometimes confrontational 
attitude to Russia and Belarus; meanwhile, 
Latvia and, to some degree, Estonia seem to be 
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pursuing a more pragmatic approach that leans 
more towards economic utility and technical as 
well as legal feasibility arguments. 
Latvia’s perception of the Astravyets issue is 
partly related to its more pessimistic 
assessment of future risks to energy security 
and security of supply in the region. Despite 
Latvia’s ability to produce almost all the 
electricity it currently consumes, AST’s risk 
assessments warn of potential deficits and, 
consequently, higher prices in the Nord Pool 
market. During a public forum in November 
2019 (entitled ‘National Integrated Energy and 
Environment Plan 2030 – the Way Towards a 
Sustainable Low-Carbon Economy’), AST 
representatives shared their concern that, by 
around 2024-2025, Baltic power generation 
capacity may not be sufficient to satisfy market 
demand. This concern is shaped by the 
forthcoming closure of oil shale plants in 
Estonia and the 2023 decommissioning of 
generating stations in Elektrėnai, 
Lithuania, due to tightening EU 
emissions standards. While the 
growing use of renewables could 
partially compensate for the loss of 
this generating capacity, such use 
would heighten the importance of 
cross-border trade flows—not only from the 
Nordic countries and Poland, but also from 
Russia and Belarus. 
In terms of enhancing security of supply and 
increasing competition in an integrated gas 
market, plans for a new LNG terminal in Skulte 
on the Gulf of Riga (approximately 50 km to the 
north of Riga) are noteworthy. According to the 
developer, the project consists of an LNG 
degasification platform with a handling capacity 
of up to 3 mtpa (million tonnes per year) and 
direct access to the Inčukalns gas storage 
facility by a new 35-km gas pipeline.108 While 
long rumoured, the project remains at a very 
early stage of development; the first public 
consultation has just taken place, and an 
environmental impact assessment is only now 
being prepared.  
The intention behind this project is to compete 
directly with the Klaipėda LNG terminal based 
on the assumption that the much lower capital 
expenditure and operational costs (chiefly due 
to its close proximity to Inčukalns) will give it an 
advantage in terms of lower usage fees.109 
While the Lithuanian government is now 
working to address persistent 
criticism over its socialisation of 
the mandatory security 
surcharge with domestic 
customers by gradually 
increasing usage fees to Latvian 
and Estonian customers, this 
assumption of the Skulte 
terminal’s developers may still 
hold true.110 However, questions still remain 
whether Skulte’s backers will eventually have to 
apply for the status of project of national 
importance in order to at least facilitate 
planning decisions, if not to pave the way to 
obtaining state financial support. At least one of 
the governing coalition parties, the New 
Conservatives, has publicly expressed support 
for the project. 
With or without this new terminal, there are 
strong imperatives for Latvia (as well as Estonia 
and Finland) to seek integration of Lithuania 
into their new regional gas market. As noted 
earlier, Lithuania will soon have the most 
connection points to outside the Baltic region. 
Its Klaipėda LNG terminal and the future GIPL 
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pipeline would be essential elements of this 
market, providing for better competitiveness, 
liquidity and security of supply. Latvia’s 
approach to negotiating with Lithuania and 
resolving the remaining issues impeding 
Lithuania‘s integration into this market will play 
an important role in determining the future 
prospects for energy security in the region. 
Likewise, Latvia will have to find ways to show 
solidarity with Lithuania on the Astravyets 
issue, as this has the potential to become truly 
toxic for the bilateral and regional 
cooperation—not just on energy issues, but 
across the whole spectrum of shared political 
challenges. Latvia’s (and Estonia’s) pragmatism 
will eventually have to be balanced with 
Lithuania’s geopolitical threat perceptions. 
Vilnius evidently treats the NPP not only as an 
environmental risk but also as a geopolitical 
weapon of its main financial backer, Russia, a 
country bent on undermining energy security in 
the Baltics by flooding their market with cheap 
subsidised electricity—thereby rendering their 
domestic production capacities 
uncompetitive.  
In this context of the above, it will be 
very important for the Baltic states to 
recognise the impact of price 
pressure from third-country 
electricity trading on both existing 
and planned sources of electricity 
generation. Accordingly, the three 
countries should develop a common 
policy not only on Astravyets, but 
also on carbon neutrality. Since most 
plans for achieving zero net 
emissions rely on the use of price signals from 
CO2  taxes, ‘carbon leakage’  through exports 
from countries that ignore (or have not made) 
climate commitments can undermine the 
decarbonisation of energy and industry while 
discouraging private investments in the Baltics. 
In an era of technological and climate policy 
revolutions, energy security can best be 
maximised—and security of supply boosted—
by maintaining openness, accessibility, 
reliability and security of information. 
Information that objective, reliable and drawn 
from primary sources provides an opportunity 
to examine planned decisions and their 
underlying assumptions. Raw data on the 
physical functioning of electricity and gas 
systems and markets has never before been so 
widely available. In the 
Baltic region, this data is 
provided by pan-European 
organisations such as 
ENTSO-E (electricity) and 
ENTSO-G (gas) as well as 
national electricity and 
natural gas TSOs, trading 
markets such as Nord Pool 
and several other open 
platforms, both free and commercial. 
Consequently, consumers, producers and 
potential investors are able to obtain and 
analyse the information they need directly. 
Energy security, climate policy and economic 
strategy will thus acquire a new dimension: the 
shared responsibility of government, industry 
and civil society for strategic choices and their 
consequences.  
In the case of Latvia, however, the ever-greater 
fragmentation of the political scene and the  
associated difficulties in reaching and 
maintaining a political consensus—as well as 
persistent public distrust in political and 
administrative elites are perhaps the greatest 
risks to national climate and energy policy 
ambitions. It can only be hoped that the very 
creditable start of the current government on 
Latvia will have to find ways to show solidarity with 
Lithuania on the Astravyets issue, as this has the potential 
to become truly toxic for the bilateral and regional 
cooperation—not just on energy issues, but across the 
whole spectrum of shared political challenges 
In the case of Latvia, the ever-greater 
fragmentation of the political scene and the 
associated difficulties in reaching and maintaining 
a political consensus—as well as persistent public 
distrust in political and administrative elites are 
perhaps the greatest risks to national climate and 
energy policy ambitions 
  
 
  
these issues after it took office early last year 
will allow it to maintain political momentum. 
The government and the prime minister are 
displaying remarkable leadership, particularly 
by going well beyond the demands of a 
somewhat indifferent society in responding to 
the climate emergency. The present coalition 
has almost three years until the next 
parliamentary election (to be held in late 2022) 
to implement its energy sector plans. However, 
the question remains whether energy and 
climate strategy—as well as progress in regional 
projects of strategic importance—can be 
sufficiently insulated from  the political turmoil 
that often accompanies fluid political coalitions 
and alliances. In the end, this task will be made 
easier if a whole-of-society perspective and 
approach to energy/climate policy become 
ingrained in Latvian political culture.  
The latest elections to Poland’s parliament 
were held on 13 October 2019. Polish citizens 
chose all 460 members of the Sejm (the lower 
house) and 100 members of the 
Senate (the upper house). With 
turnout of 61.74%, the incumbent 
Law and Justice (PiS) party 
received 43.59% of votes, the 
highest result for any party since 
1989. PiS—which also came first 
in the 2015 election—won 235 
seats in the Sejm, giving it an 
absolute majority and enabling it 
to continue exercising power. 
Meanwhile, the main ‘big tent’ electoral 
alliance, known as the Civic Coalition (formed 
with participation of the Civic Platform, which 
was in power from 2007-2015), received 27.4% 
of the vote, giving it 134 seats; The Left 
(12.56%, 49 seats) finished third; two other 
groups—the Polish Coalition (an alliance of 
Christian Democrats and supporters of direct 
democracy) and the eurosceptic Confederation 
also secured seats in the Sejm.111  
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The situation is different in the Senate, where 
despite the victory of PiS (48 senators), it 
cannot establish an independent majority. The 
opposition formed an alliance against PiS, 
leading to the election of its candidate Tomasz 
Grodzki as speaker. However, the Senate has 
limited significance in Polish legislation; its veto 
on legislation passed by the lower house can be 
overturned by a supermajority of the Sejm. 
More immediately, the PiS victory meant that 
the government of Prime Minister Mateusz 
Morawiecki (formed in 2017 after an internal 
party reshuffle that saw the ouster of the Beata 
Szydło government [2015-2017]) will remain in 
office. 
In 2020, the term of office of current president 
Andrzej Duda—also associated with PiS—will 
expire, with the next elections scheduled for 10 
May (and postponed until June due to the 
coronavirus pandemic crisis and the associated 
quarantine measures in the country). The Polish 
president is elected directly, using the two-
round system; however, the head of state has 
only limited powers to affect energy policy 
(among them being the ability to veto laws 
adopted by parliament). During his current 
term, President Duda has not been active in the 
field of energy; his public statements on the 
topic have essentially been limited to 
expressing support for government policies, 
particularly in opposing the Nord Stream 2 
(NS2) undersea gas pipeline between Russia 
and Germany.112 The situation may become 
different if an opposition candidate wins the 
elections; electoral considerations are already 
shaping the timeline of Polish government 
actions with regard to EU climate policy 
initiatives (see section 5.6 below). 
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Energy issues were not strongly emphasised in 
the public debate or on the campaign trail 
leading up to the 2019 parliamentary elections 
in Poland. The most important energy issue of 
that year that political parties did address was 
the growing pressure on the electricity prices 
from the rising cost both of CO2 emission 
allowances and of coal prices (some 70% of 
domestic electricity production is from coal and 
lignite). The Polish government took measures 
to protect the consumers from the effects of 
this pressure. The main intention was to 
maintain average electricity bills at their 2018 
levels. To achieve this, the excise duty on 
electricity was significantly reduced and other 
related additional fees and charges lowered. As 
a result, throughout 2019, Polish consumers’ 
power bills remained the same as those of the 
previous year. However, due to their cost, these 
measures cannot be continued in 2020, so 
electricity bills will gradually increase; 
nevertheless, the government declared that it 
would adopt a consumer compensation system 
by the end of the year.  
The 2019 system of price support for 
consumers did not include entrepreneurs and 
local governments, so their electricity 
expenditures increased. This was reflected in 
the growing popularity of small-scale 
generating capacity (e.g., at the end of 2018, 
nationwide installed solar power capacity 
installed in Poland was 471.4 MW, compared to 
about 1,185 MW a year later).113 Meanwhile, 
the ‘freezing’ of electricity bills was criticised by 
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the opposition which characterised the policy 
as a ploy designed to shore up public support 
for PiS in the run-up to the elections.114  
Climate issues, however, were present in the 
pre-election political debate. According to 
Eurobarometer, about 70% of the Polish people 
identify climate change as a very serious 
problem.115 The opposition claimed that the 
government was not doing enough to 
implement various decarbonisation measures, 
accusing it of, at best, general 
reluctance to take action on 
countering climate change—and at 
worse, of pursuing projects leading 
towards the opposite result. 
Poland’s stance within the EU with 
regard to climate policy has been 
characterised as one chiefly 
focused on finding ways to opt out 
from Brussels’ emissions targets, 
an approach the opposition 
labelled ‘anti-European’ and 
‘short-sighted’. An example of the criticised 
actions was the investment that started in 2017 
in Ostrołęka, about 120 km north of Warsaw, 
where a new 1,000 MW coal-fired power plant 
was planned. The government declared that 
this would be the last new coal-fired power 
plant built in Poland; however, it is not planned 
to be completed before 2025, a time at which 
the European Green Deal is expected to be 
already in force.116  
These issues were also raised during the 
election campaign. However, the governing PiS 
focused on presenting its biggest successes 
from its term in office rather than responding 
to criticisms. Among the success stories it 
touted were organising and hosting the 24th 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(COP24), as well as initiatives against smog in 
the cities and support programmes for 
prosumers. They also promoted the announced 
merger of PKN Orlen and Lotos, two largest 
Polish fuel companies, with a vision of creating 
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a fuel industry giant in Central Europe. In the 
meantime, other parties focused on general 
demands regarding renewable energy support, 
thermo-modernisation and energy efficiency. 
During the campaign, the activity of the NGO 
Youth Climate Strike increased, capturing public 
attention. The decarbonisation demands of the 
‘strikers’ were supported by the Civic Coalition, 
the Left and the Polish Coalition.  
The cleavages between PiS and the 
opposition over energy and climate 
issues do not mean that there is no 
scope for consensus. The governing 
party and its political opposition 
seem to be on the same page 
concerning the need to diversify 
gas and oil supplies away from 
Russia—an issue whose urgency was yet again 
highlighted by oil supply delivery problems 
experienced by Belarus at the end of 2019 as a 
result of strongly geopolitically-tinged economic 
disagreements between Minsk and Moscow.117 
There is currently no political party in Poland 
that supports maintaining the current energy 
supply model, in which Russia still has a major 
role. 
Immediately after the elections in October 
2019, there were significant changes in 
supervision of the Polish energy sector. The 
Ministry of Energy—headed by Krzysztof 
Tchórzewski, the main architect of Polish 
energy policy until that year—was dissolved. Its 
functions were divided among three new 
ministries: 
 Ministry of Climate, a new ministry 
headed by Michał Kurtyka, former 
deputy minister of energy and 
president of COP24. This ministry will 
supervise energy regulations and 
climate policy. Moreover, within this 
ministry, there will be a government 
plenipotentiary for RES.  
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 Ministry of State Assets, headed by 
Deputy Prime Minister Jacek Sasin. This 
ministry will exercise ownership 
supervision over state-owned energy 
companies.  
 Ministry of Development, headed by 
Jadwiga Emilewicz. In the energy area, 
the ministry will supervise clean-air 
measures.  
This division of tasks reflects the government's 
plans and priorities for energy for the current 
term. These priorities include: 
 Reform of corporate governance. The 
purpose of this reform is to harmonise 
the activities of all state-owned 
companies so that they begin “to 
function as one organism”, as Deputy 
Prime Minister Sasin explained.118 To 
achieve this goal, five teams were 
established in the Ministry of State 
Assets; each will deal with a distinct 
area such as holdings law, reforms to 
the functioning of supervisory boards 
and issues related to access and 
protection of data.119  
 Development of offshore wind farms, 
to achieve the goals set in National 
Energy Policy (PEP2040) and the 
National Plan for Energy and Climate. 
This area will be the everyday 
responsibility of the government’s 
plenipotentiary for RES. At present, 
work on draft legislation establishing a 
public support system for offshore wind 
farms is in progress.  
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 The government will also continue its 
efforts directed at promoting 
household thermomodernisation of 
households, replacing home stoves and 
increasing energy efficiency. It plans to 
adopt a new support system for 
households affected by rising energy 
prices at the end of 2020.  
It is with this structure and priorities that the 
Polish government is now setting out to revisit 
and redraw national policies and plans for 
energy and climate issues—and engage key 
domestic and international stakeholders—in 
the medium to long-term.  
The topic of the European Green Deal has been 
resonating ever more strongly in the Polish 
debate since the December 2019 European 
Council summit. Discussions have centred 
around analysing the 
opportunities for Polish 
regions related to the JTF 
announced by the European 
Commission as part of the 
proposed European Green 
Deal, as well as the Polish 
strategy on achieving full 
decarbonisation—a difficult goal due to strong 
dependence of the Polish economy on fossil 
fuels.  
The issue of decarbonisation is directly related 
to the country’s reliance on aging power 
generation sources, most of which were 
commissioned in the 1970s and 80s. Currently, 
most are struggling to achieve even current 
emission standards. The situation will get still 
more complicated after 2025, when stricter 
increased European emission requirements for 
the power plants applying for capacity support 
mechanisms will come into force. This means 
that a large number of currently operating coal 
and lignite power plants will have to be closed 
after this date—opening space for a more 
fundamental discussion about the future shape 
of energy mix in Poland, as well as shorter-term 
measures to meet electricity demand after 
2025.  
Three general potential scenarios emerge from 
the debate: 1) an increased share of RES, 
supported by gas; 2) maintaining the share of 
coal units with a gradual increase in the share 
of RES, 3) and construction of a nuclear power 
plant. To date, discussions on this topic are 
conducted mainly among experts; political 
parties refer to these issues only in a minimal 
way. The governing party's 
programme, shaping the 
government's actions, seems 
to be a combination of all 
three scenarios.  
Predictions regarding 
decarbonisation and the 
inevitably decreased role of 
coal in Polish energy raise questions about the 
future of the country’s mining sector. They are 
compounded by the growing cost of coal mining 
and high prices of CO2 emission allowances. The 
growing price of Polish coal and its poor quality 
have already led to a situation in which Polish 
companies import cheaper and better-quality 
fuel from Russia.120 This is criticised by 
opposition parties and trade unions alike. 
Eventually, the deputy prime minister 
announced in February 2020 that the 
government will seek to prevent the state-
owned companies from importing cheaper coal 
from Russia.121 However, this will only solve one 
of the problems—while saddling energy 
companies with higher input prices (which will 
translate directly into higher electricity and 
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heating bills). What is worth emphasising is that 
none of the opposition parties explicitly 
demands a limit to coal mining in Poland—
albeit mainly to avoid incurring the political 
wrath of miners, their trade unions and 
supporters. Government representatives, in 
turn, occasionally declare their intent to 
maintain coal extraction at the current level—
or even increase it in the future.122  
On the other hand, natural gas has become a 
cheaper and abundantly available alternative to 
coal. In recent years, the Polish gas market has 
experienced a series of major developments. 
The ‘game changer’ was the inauguration of an 
LNG terminal in Świnoujście, which immediately 
enabled Poland to obtain gas from any non-
Russian source; currently Poland already has 
supply agreements with the United States and 
Qatar. The government has already announced 
the expansion of this terminal—signing a 
contract in February of this year; it is even 
considering the construction of a new one.123 
The terminal’s current regasification capacity is 
5 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year; and the 
expansion plans envisage increasing it to 7.5 
bcm.  
The gas market will also see an influx of 
supplies from the North Sea via the Baltic Pipe 
link to Denmark; construction of this 
interconnection is currently underway. 
According to plans, transmission via this 
pipeline will be possible starting in October 
2022. It will be able to transport up to 10 bcm 
of natural gas annually to Poland, covering up 
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to 60% of domestic demand.124 On the other 
hand, it is estimated that in coming years, the 
demand for natural gas in the Polish economy 
will grow, thus possibly straining even the 
expanded gas infrastructure capacity.  
Beginning in 2016, one of the most important 
topics in the Polish debate—especially during 
the heating season—is air pollution. This 
problem, which is particularly acute in urban 
areas, evokes urgent public demands for 
effective government action to address a 
problem with serious implications for public 
health, quality of life and environment. This is 
now reflected in a fairly wide range of 
government's policies and activities 
such as: enhancing quality 
standards for solid fuels; 
eliminating high-emission heating 
sources; providing support to 
thermomodernisation of single-
family houses, and increasing the 
number of air quality measuring 
stations.  
In 2018, the Polish Ministry of Energy published 
a draft of a new National Energy Policy 
(PEP2040) outlining the road ahead for the 
sector up to the year 2040.125 The policy 
presents a strategic approach to the most 
important challenges that Poland is likely to 
encounter over the upcoming decades. 
PEP2040 is one of nine sectoral strategies in 
Poland foreseen as a contribution to the 
European effort to create sustainable and 
environmentally friendly economies. After the 
first phase of public consultations, the first draft 
version was updated. The version published in 
November 2019 follows quite closely the PiS’s 
political programme and envisages the 
following:  
 Effective use of domestic energy 
resources focusing on innovative ways 
of using coal to minimise environmental 
impacts, as well as on the search for 
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new natural gas and crude oil deposits. 
At the same time, the critical 
importance of coal to the national 
energy balance is emphasised. 
 Investments in energy generation and 
distribution infrastructure to facilitate 
broader changes in the electricity 
generation mix while replacing aging 
power generation units. With regard to 
the latter, the document points to the 
capacity market introduced in 2017 as 
one remedial action.  
 Natural gas and oil supply 
diversification based on the 
development of infrastructure such as 
the Baltic Pipe project and expansion of 
the LNG terminal in Świnoujście. (As 
part of diversification of crude oil 
supplies, it is planned to expand the 
Pomeranian Pipeline that will allow for 
an increase in the share of non-Russian 
oil imports, in particular, crude oil from 
the Middle East).126  
 Energy market development to achieve 
fully transparent and competitive 
electricity, natural gas and liquid fuels 
markets with a strong focus on ensuring 
the participation of leading consumers. 
Poland will strive to cover the demand 
for electricity using domestic 
generation. Cross-border connections 
should be an additional source of 
supply, aimed at promoting market 
development, reducing electricity 
prices, and ensuring the security of 
supply in emergency situations.  
 Lowering energy sector emissions 
whilst increasing security of supply, 
primarily as a result of commissioning 
the first Polish nuclear power plant. 
 Increasing the share of RES in energy 
consumption, primarily in the 
electricity-generation, transport and 
heating/cooling sectors, with a 
combined total of 21% of RES in final 
energy consumption by 2030. The main 
strategic direction in this area is 
development of offshore wind farms.  
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 Investments in heat and electricity 
cogeneration in order to support broad 
access to public heating, thereby 
facilitating minimisation of the 
individual use of environmentally-
harmful fuels. 
 General energy efficiency 
improvements targeted at increasing 
the competitiveness of the national 
economy; this goal is measured by 
metrics including primary energy 
savings milestones and progress in 
reducing energy poverty. 
The document lists the following indicators by 
which progress towards achieving these goals 
can be assessed: 
 56-60% share of coal in electricity 
generation in 2030 (compared to over 
70% currently); 
 21-23% RES in gross final energy 
consumption in 2030 ( compared to 
about 12%  at present); 
 adoption of nuclear energy beginning in 
2033; 
 improvement of energy efficiency by 
23% in 2030 compared to 2007 levels; 
 30% CO2 reduction by 2030 (compared 
to 1990 levels). 
A slightly diverging set of ambitions has been 
outlined in the National Plan for Energy and 
Climate for 2021-2030, prepared for the 
European Commission.127 After approval of the 
final version of the plan by the Commission, 
PEP2040 is expected to be updated—thus 
guaranteeing cohesion between these two 
documents. The plan anticipates a much faster 
decommissioning of the old coal power 
plants—only 6,800 MW will be produced by old 
hard coal power plants in 2030 (in the PEP2040, 
this figure is 9,300 MW). If the plan's 
assumptions hold true, Poland will close half of 
its old coal power plants in the next ten years—
and over half of lignite power plants by 2035. 
Both documents agree that the last coal power 
plant built in Poland is to be the Ostrołęka 
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facility mentioned above.128 The plan also 
envisages a significant development of 
electromobility: by 2025, a million of electric 
cars are expected on the roads in Poland.  
Generally, the National Plan indicates the 
following goals for 2030: 
 7% reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions in non-ETS 
sectors, as compared to 2005 
levels; 
 21-23% share of RES in final gross 
energy consumption (the 23% target 
will be achievable if additional EU funds 
are allocated to Poland, including those 
intended for ‘just transformation’), 
including:  
o 14% share of RES in transport; 
o a yearly increase in the share of 
renewable energy in heating 
and cooling by 1.1%; 
 23% increase in energy efficiency 
compared to 2007 levels; 
 56-60% share of coal in electricity 
generation in 2030. 
The plan was submitted to the European 
Commission at the end of December 2019; 
however, in January of this year, the climate 
minister  signalled  the  need  to  further  review  
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and make some changes to the document—in 
particular, to the share of RES in the planned 
future energy mix.129  
The most important event concerning EU 
climate policy in recent months was the 
December 2019 decision of the European 
Council to adopt the goal of achieving carbon 
neutrality by 2050. This ambition became the 
basis of the European Green Deal, a broad set 
of initiatives aimed at transforming European 
climate and energy law.  
Poland has not yet endorsed this ambition; 
however, this does not mean that the 
government plans to use its veto power to 
block future implementation. The Polish 
government seems to be fully aware of the 
inevitability of decarbonisation, an awareness 
reflected in the official documents. It is also 
evident from Warsaw’s efforts to secure greater 
funding from the JTF—the proposed European 
financial mechanism designed to mitigate the 
negative socio-economic impact of energy 
transition—for transforming Polish mining 
regions. After the December 2019 
announcement, the Polish government 
formally asked for more time to 
analyse the implications of carbon 
neutrality for Poland’s economy and 
society. This analysis will be presented 
at the Council summit in June 2020.  
One reason for this delay is strong 
opposition to decarbonisation from the 
largest Polish trade unions. According 
to many commentators, the 
government does not want to create a situation 
in which resistance from trade unions would 
lower support for President Duda in the 2020 
election. However, even after the presidential 
election, social resistance—from mining regions 
as well as trade unions—will remain one of the 
greatest obstacles towards the achievement of 
Polish climate goals, as well as the fulfilment of 
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existing and anticipated future policy 
commitments. Since changes in current energy 
policy—especially adjustments to the country’s 
energy mix—will inevitably mean a shift 
towards decarbonisation, this will have 
considerable consequences on employment 
rates in mining regions. The significant 
dependence of the Polish economy on coal also 
means higher transformation costs compared 
to other European countries; for Poland, they 
are roughly estimated to be between €179–206 
billion. Although they will be partly covered by 
the EU funds (e.g. from JTF), a significant part of 
the transition costs will still have to be borne by 
Polish taxpayers and consumers who remain 
price-sensitive—and who already face higher 
electricity bills beginning this year. 
Another challenge will be also ensuring the 
availability of sufficient generation capacity 
after decommissioning the old coal and lignite 
power plants. The solution here may be the 
introduction of an effective support system 
(currently in the development stages) for 
offshore wind energy. As noted above, Poland 
also plans to inaugurate its first nuclear power 
plant by 2033. However, this goal will be rather 
difficult to achieve: the location for the plant 
has not yet been selected, and its financial 
model is still under preparation; moreover, the 
country would also have to build its nuclear 
energy regulatory framework and supervisory 
capacity almost from scratch—all while 
resolving numerous complex and often 
politically-controversial issues regarding various 
aspects of managing nuclear power production 
(especially the management and disposal of 
spent fuel). 
One of the most important strands of the Polish 
government’s energy policy—and the one that 
enjoys the broadest cross-party support—is the 
goal of making the Polish economy 
independent of gas supplies from Russia by 
2022. In November 2019, Poland announced 
that it would not extend or renegotiate the 
unfavourable Yamal contract—a long-term 
agreement for natural gas supplies between 
Polish gas company PGNiG and Gazprom that is 
set to expire in 2022.130 In addition to the LNG 
terminal in Świnoujście and the undersea Baltic 
Pipe interconnector to Denmark and the North 
Sea, Polish gas companies are encouraged to 
conduct domestic shale gas exploration. 
Moreover, by the same token, Poland also 
supports the efforts of the Baltic states to 
become independent of gas supplies from 
Russia—efforts that will be boosted by 
completion of the GIPL pipeline to Lithuania. 
This strong push towards diminishing the 
potential for Russia to use its gas supplies as an 
instrument of geopolitical pressure on Poland 
and its EU neighbours is also 
reflected in Warsaw’s position 
in relation to NS2. Together 
with the Baltic states and 
Ukraine, Poland remains 
among the staunch opponents 
of the project; Warsaw 
perceives NS2 as instrumental 
to Moscow’s ambitions to keep 
the EU dependent on Russian 
gas imports, undermine 
Ukrainian security, and ensure 
that the EU and Eastern Partnership countries 
remain vulnerable to strategic coercion and 
malignant political influence.131 Although such a 
stance has put Warsaw on a collision course 
with Berlin on more than one occasion, it is 
unlikely to change under the present 
government; moreover, it closely follows the 
geopolitical  concerns  of a  key  security  ally  of  
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Poland, the United States (which in December 
2019 announced sanctions against the 
companies involved in NS2 construction).132 
Poland is also involved in the synchronisation of 
the Baltic states with the electricity grid of 
Continental Europe. Currently Poland and the 
Baltic states are linked through the LitPolLink 
overland HVAC interconnector; there are now 
plans for another connection, the Harmony Link 
undersea HVDC cable, which should be finished 
before 2025 (although, as noted in the chapter 
on Lithuania, there are some indications that it 
may instead be completed only by 2027).133 As 
Polish electricity TSO Polskie Sieci 
Elektroenergetyczne (PSE) declared, this 
connection—in conjunction with LitPolLink—
will be sufficient to guarantee 
the security of supply to the 
Baltic states after their 
synchronisation with the 
Continental European system. 
An undersea connection is 
estimated by Polish and 
Lithuanian sides as a safer 
option compared to the 
construction of a second 
overland interconnector (although some 
studies argue that, from the perspective of 
critical infrastructure protection and the 
situation in maritime security and defence in 
the Baltic Sea, this might actually not be the 
case).134 Moreover, an HVDC cable was 
considered as technically necessary for 
synchronisation.135 The required investment for 
a link with a capacity of 700–1,000 MW is 
estimated at €700–850 million.136  
The construction by Belarus of Astravyets NPP 
is virtually never mentioned in Polish public 
discussions. Coverage of the project appears in 
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Polish media only in the context of safety 
incidents encountered during construction, 
with articles discussing the related potential risk 
of radioactive contamination. However, the 
Polish government has consistently refused 
even to consider purchases of electricity from 
Astravyets NPP—just as it does not see any 
possibility of buying electricity from a 
technologically similar NPP that Russia is 
planning to build in its Kaliningrad exclave.137  
Due to this position, Poland proceeded with 
demolishing the power line connecting it with 
Belarus (Białystok-Ros). However, there still 
remains a threat that electricity from Astravyets 
will enter the EU system via other physical 
interconnections and market-based trading 
mechanisms, e.g. through trading on electricity 
market exchanges. It is likely that counteracting 
such measures will be one of the most 
important priorities of the Polish government 
during the Baltic synchronisation process. 
Warsaw seeks to create a situation by which 
the transmission of electricity from Belarus to 
Europe would not be possible for technical 
reasons. This will be further facilitated, for 
example, by closing cross-border connections 
between Lithuania and Belarus; however, Polish 
and Lithuanian action alone are not fully 
sufficient, and require cooperation and 
coordination with Latvia, Estonia and Finland.  
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Despite frequent political change—and 
occasional political turmoil—there is a high 
degree of continuity in the energy and climate 
policies of the Baltic region. It does not seem to 
be affected by the challenges of managing 
complex coalition politics or inter-institutional 
relations. However, with the exception of 
Finland, this situation may be due more to the 
fairly low ranking of these issues on the agenda 
both of voters and of politicians (thus giving 
relatively free reign to  policies devised by 
technical experts that align with the EU’s 
overall policy) rather than due to any deeply-
rooted, broad political and societal consensus.  
However, continuous formal political support 
for energy transition and energy security goals 
is an important enabler of achieving them; the 
fragility of the governing coalitions in four out 
of five studied countries is a significant political 
risk factor that may impede further progress in 
implementing policies and strategies in place 
or, indeed, in enhancing national levels of 
ambition.  
There is a risk, however, that the 
populist political forces—present 
in all five countries—may identify 
energy and climate as an attractive 
vector for stirring up a backlash 
from the societies against energy 
sector’s transformation. Currently, 
these forces are not yet exploiting 
the issues of climate change and carbon 
neutrality to challenge the alignment of 
national goals with the EU policies. However, 
this may well change as the details of the 
European Green Deal start emerging and the 
national goals come under greater scrutiny. 
Estonia’s and Poland’s cautiousness regarding 
the high level of European climate ambition is 
indicative of the domestic political constraints 
faced by these two countries—and by the 
region as a whole. The political risk is that, as 
the economic costs of energy transition become 
more apparent and the socio-economic 
implications to vulnerable populations become 
evident, this will become yet another issue to 
be exploited in political attacks on what is often 
framed as ‘Brussels diktat’. The expected severe 
economic fallout from the 
lockdowns imposed to contain 
the coronavirus pandemic will 
reduce governments’ ability to 
enact the costly measures seen 
as necessary to address the 
climate emergency. The 
existing political will, in the 
absence of much stronger 
public interest in and support to the energy 
transition in some of the studied countries, 
should not be taken for granted. 
The European Green Deal will be a major ‘game 
changer’ for all five nations, but it will be 
further deliberated and discussed in the 
fragmenting—and rather confrontational—
domestic political landscapes where new 
election cycles are starting (Poland, with a 
presidential election slated for June) or are 
about to start (Lithuania, which will hold its 
parliamentary elections in October). If short-
term negative trends such as electricity price 
increases or labour market shocks due to 
layoffs in legacy industries (e.g., fossil fuel 
mining) occur, it is not difficult to see how this 
could translate into politically motivated attacks 
on the commitments and objectives that flow 
from the European Green Deal. Much will 
depend, of course, on the degree of financial 
support and mitigating measures ultimately 
provided as well as on the depth of the post-
pandemic economic downturn; but no one 
should expect a smooth and politically 
uncontested  process  of  decarbonisation. 
There is a risk that the populist political forces—present 
in all five countries—may identify energy and climate as 
an attractive vector for stirring up a backlash from the 
societies against energy sector’s transformation 
The existing political will, in the absence of much 
stronger public interest in and support to the energy 
transition in some of the studied countries, should 
not be taken for granted 
  
 
  
In this regard, the emerging positive political 
narratives in most countries about the 
European Green Deal as a major opportunity 
are very important in shaping public 
perceptions and furthering political discourse. 
In the ideal world, those narratives would 
counterbalance negative sentiments and 
prepare fortify societies to bear the 
short- and medium-term pain for 
long term gain.  
Yet, negative populism is often 
stronger and more rewarding in 
short-termist domestic politics; 
accordingly, it will inevitably be a 
significant factor in national energy 
and climate policies in the context of 
the European Green Deal in the coming years. 
Again, with the exception of Finland, the 
electoral events of 2018-19 have done little to 
establish, across the region, the dominance of a 
positive narrative of opportunity for economic 
development driven by energy transformation. 
Still, the economic forces, regulatory 
frameworks, prosumer support schemes, 
technological developments and infrastructure 
investments seem to be tilting the entire game 
towards less-polluting sources of 
energy (e.g. natural gas) and more 
widespread adoption of renewables 
across the region. Fundamentally, 
even the most conservative political 
players seem to understand that 
energy transition is inevitable, and 
that only the questions of speed and 
cost (as well as the scope of socio-
economic mitigation) are contestable. 
More importantly, it is becoming increasingly 
obvious that there are synergies between 
energy transition on the one hand and energy 
security solutions on the other.  
Security remains a paramount consideration in 
the region, especially in the present geopolitical 
context—where Russia continues to use energy 
dependencies as a tool of coercion and 
expanding its malignant political influence. It 
weighs heavily when pursuing long-term energy 
transition targets and goals and, occasionally, 
may run counter to the latter (e.g. by 
challenging Estonia’s self-sufficiency in 
electricity production based on domestic 
reserves of oil shale). One blind 
spot, however, is regional 
coordination. As regional 
integration of energy markets and 
infrastructure continues making 
significant progress, and as 
nations become ever more inter-
dependent, their lack of 
coordinated approach in planning 
and implementing various 
measures of energy transition 
may eventually jeopardise energy 
security throughout the entire region. 
Furthermore, their lack of coordinated—even 
synchronised—approach to state aid provided 
to energy producers (including in the RES 
sector) may undermine the level playing field 
required for the proper functioning of 
integrated regional markets. 
Some of the studied countries seem to realise 
that they might face deficits of electricity 
production capacity after retiring old power 
generation units in the coming years, and that 
With the exception of Finland, the electoral events 
of 2018-19 have done little to establish, across the 
region, the dominance of a positive narrative of 
opportunity for economic development driven by 
energy transformation 
Still, the economic forces, regulatory frameworks, 
prosumer support schemes, technological 
developments and infrastructure investments seem to 
be tilting the entire game towards less-polluting 
sources of energy (e.g. natural gas) and more 
widespread adoption of renewables across the region 
Security remains a paramount consideration in the 
region, especially in the present geopolitical 
context—where Russia continues to use energy 
dependencies as a tool of coercion and expanding 
its malignant political influence 
  
 
  
increased cross-border trade flows might not be 
a sufficient solution—as such capacities might 
become equally scarce in neighbouring 
countries. This opens up windows of 
opportunity not only for investors interested in 
bolstering domestic power production 
capacities, but also to advocates of continuing 
imports from Russia or Belarus—regardless of 
the impact such imports have on domestic 
producers, the environment (thanks to the 
uneven playing field enjoyed by producers in 
those two countries), or, indeed, potentially 
corrupting influence on the politics of importing 
countries.  
Although practical implementation of strategic 
energy projects such as synchronisation with 
the Continental European system is going 
forward, the risk of tensions over diverging 
national threat assessments and perceptions 
remains—as captured by the debate 
surrounding the Astravyets NPP. This 
divergence may well put a strain on political 
solidarity in managing potential crises as well as 
resolving issues in strategic projects that 
require political intervention and political will. 
The need for more regional cooperation, 
coordination and solidarity is a recurring theme 
in this report, and is clearly interlinked with all 
the studied countries. Whether in shaping the 
European Green Deal and exploiting the 
opportunities that will flow from it, or in 
maintaining resilience in the face of Russia’s 
continuing malignant influence in the energy 
sector, such cooperation and coordination will 
remain of pivotal importance to the future 
prospects of the region.  
The outcome of the electoral cycle of 2018-
2019 has not undermined or eroded the cross-
regional consensus on ongoing strategic energy 
projects; however, it has done little to advance 
more coherence and convergence on the next 
round of challenging issues that the region will 
inevitably face. While the region’s countries 
have largely relied on Brussels to broker 
compromises (often with the help of 
considerable funding) in a post-pandemic 
world, both the political 
bandwidth and financial resources 
will likely be constrained. Given 
the significant economic, human, 
and political changes underway as 
a result of the pandemic, however, 
it is an open question to what 
extent the region can weather the 
far more turbulent times ahead. 
Yet, there is a new generation of 
political, societal and business 
leaders emerging in most, if not all, five 
countries eager to address common challenges 
in energy and climate policies. It will 
increasingly be up to them to come together to 
share best practices and work out joint 
solutions that will maintain the wider Baltic 
area as a great success story not only in energy 
security, but also in an energy transition that 
will someday make a carbon-neutral Europe 
possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whether in shaping the European Green Deal and 
exploiting the opportunities that will flow from it, or 
in maintaining resilience in the face of Russia’s 
continuing malignant influence in the energy sector, 
cooperation and coordination will remain of pivotal 
importance to the future prospects of the region 
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